

## Fifty years after Canada's last foreign-policy review, our identity is more precarious than ever

David Mulroney

Globe and Mail, February 17, 2020

This year marks a half-century since the publication of *Foreign Policy for Canadians* – the first and, really, only serious effort by a Canadian government to conduct a public and comprehensive rethinking of Canada's role in the world.

By the late 1960s, as the new Liberal government of Pierre Trudeau was getting down to business, the need for a review was obvious. The outsize influence we enjoyed in the years after the Second World War had largely diminished as allies and enemies recovered, and as a host of newly independent nations claimed their own stakes in world affairs.

In addition to understanding and adapting to our diminished status in a far more competitive international community, we also needed to reclaim our independence in the face of what appeared to be almost overwhelming U.S. economic influence.

Looking back on it now, *Foreign Policy for Canadians* had mixed results. It anticipated a new role for Canada – a more realistic, if also more modest, vision of a well-intentioned middle power, navigating by the pole star of the United Nations. It is a role we continue to play.

But the review, and the policy initiatives that followed it, significantly underestimated the breadth and depth of our relationship with the United States. Efforts at diversifying trade – what was known as the Third Option, favouring Europe and Japan – went nowhere. What is perhaps worse is that we never really acknowledged that failure. Instead, we became comfortable with a two-track foreign policy, one that allowed us to play the gratifying role of helper-fixer in the world, secure in the knowledge that our actual security and prosperity would be worked out through our relationship with Washington.

Given the turbulence in world affairs, foreign-policy planners rarely dare to project beyond a decade. So we shouldn't wonder that much has changed since the release of *Foreign Policy for Canadians*. Indeed, the situation has almost entirely flipped.

Canada is again dealing with a threat to our autonomy from a major power, but this time, it comes not from the United States, but from the new world that was coming into being 50 years ago. The threat is now China, which is using its economic power to

influence and silence us, is undermining our national security, and is challenging the rules-based international system that the review itself championed.

And we again need to face up to the consequences of our diminished status, but this time much closer to home. Fifty years on, the problem isn't that the United States wants to dominate us, but that it has largely forgotten us. While it is tempting to blame this on the chaos of the Trump era, the painful reality is that the relationship has been in decline for some time, something that was manifestly evident in the cool detachment that marked Barack Obama's management of relations with Canada.

Fifty years is a long time to wait between reviews, but actually conducting one would require our current government to face three hard truths. The first, acknowledged in the 1970 review but largely ignored in its implementation, is that good foreign policy flows from sound domestic policy. International influence is enabled by a strong economy, robust national infrastructure and institutions, and the willingness to invest in national defence and security.

The second challenge, also acknowledged in 1970 but never adequately addressed, is that successful foreign policy requires the confident elaboration of national identity. Half a century ago, we were still enjoying – perhaps naively – a sense of national accomplishment and purpose, and a belief in our future that was linked to a quiet pride in our past. It would have been inconceivable to the authors of the 1970 review that a future prime minister could muse, as Justin Trudeau did in 2015, that Canada has “no core identity” – an assertion that is as confusing to other countries as it is to Canadians.

A third and final challenge in developing foreign policy – a challenge the Liberal government of 1970 fully met – involves encouraging a sense of shared national purpose. Foreign Policy for Canadians was released in a series of booklets that managed to be both reader-friendly and respectful of the intelligence of Canadians.

It's time for another honest and comprehensive rethink of our place in the world – one premised on the fact that foreign policy for Canadians needs to be worked out with Canadians.

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## WILL BRITAIN'S DECISION ON HUAWEI HELP CANADA TO FINALLY DECIDE?

Hugh Stephens

University of Calgary, School of Public Policy, January 29, 2020

After months of deliberation and high-level pressure from the US, Britain has finally reached a decision on whether or not to allow Chinese technology supplier Huawei to participate in the rollout of 5G networks in the UK. In an announcement made on January 28, Prime Minister Boris Johnson announced that Huawei would be allowed limited participation. The compromise will allow “high risk vendors” (a definition which is deemed to include Huawei) to be a supplier to non-core parts of the network, with

participation capped at 35 percent, while being banned from critical networks and sensitive sites. This British decision should help the Trudeau government to reach a decision that is based on Canada's national interest.

The question of Huawei's participation in 5G networks is very much rolled up in the US-China technology war and US suspicion of China, increasingly viewing it as a strategic competitor if not future adversary. Huawei, one of China's technology champions, has been targeted by the US as a Chinese "Trojan Horse" particularly given recent Chinese legislation requiring Chinese companies to cooperate with Chinese security agencies. The US has moved to ban Huawei from participation in 5G in the US, and has increasingly put pressure on US companies not to sell components and technology to Huawei. Having "crossed the Rubicon" with Huawei, the US has put increasing pressure on its intelligence sharing allies, the so-called "Five Eyes" network of the US, UK, Canada, Australia and New Zealand, to do the same, under threat that intelligence sharing could be cut off.

Australia has complied with the US demands, New Zealand has waffled but semi-complied, and now the UK has made a decision to allow Huawei into 5G networks but to restrict its access. Meanwhile, Canada has kicked the can down the road but the end of that road is rapidly approaching, and the UK decision gives Canada some welcome support and "cover" to reach a similar balanced decision. The stakes are high.

Huawei is a major investor in both the UK and Canada; in fact a large part of Huawei's R&D on 5G is based in Canada, building on the Nortel patents that Huawei purchased after Nortel's demise. The industrial benefits to Huawei's continued operations in Canada are considerable, much more so than Huawei's limited presence in the US. But what about security issues and the Five Eyes intelligence sharing?

Does Huawei pose a potential risk to security of 5G networks? Yes, for two reasons. First, because of the speed with which it has developed its technology, Huawei is known to have weaker security than some other suppliers. Both the UK and Canada have established joint testing facilities with Huawei to ensure that any weak "back-doors" in its technology are identified and fixed. Then there is the question of deliberate secret "backdoors" built into the technology by Huawei to enable Chinese spying or disruption of networks. Huawei has denied any such intention and no evidence has been found of such "Trojan horses" but the suspicion of China is palpable. If you don't trust China, you won't trust a Chinese company, especially one so close to Beijing that the Chinese government will take the drastic action of holding Canadians in China hostage because of Canada's willingness to arrest a senior Huawei official, Meng Wanzhou, on a US extradition warrant.

Does this mean that all the benefits that come with doing business with Huawei, from participation in its R&D program, to having access to a competitively-priced alternate suppliers for Canadian infrastructure providers like Telus and Bell (who already use Huawei equipment in their existing networks) have to be sacrificed on the altar of security and intelligence-sharing? I would argue that the UK decision shows that it is possible to do both. Britain has some of the top cyber experts in the world, and if British cyber-security and intelligence officials are satisfied that the Huawei risk can be

managed, it is hard to understand why the same would not apply to Canada. There will always be risk, whether the supplier is Huawei or another company, and the important thing is to recognize and manage that risk.

As for the US threat to cut countries that deal with Huawei out of the Five Eyes intelligence sharing arrangement, this has to be understood in context. It is an intelligence-sharing arrangement, not just a network to disseminate US intelligence to its partners. Canada plays a not insignificant role in the collection of signal intelligence through its unique geographic location, and thus makes an important contribution to the network. Moreover, it is in the US interest to share intelligence with Canada in combatting terrorist threats to North America.

All these factors suggest that it is time that Ottawa made a decision on Huawei that is in Canada's overall national interest. Our relations with the US, including intelligence-sharing, are part of that national interest but are not the only factors to consider. The UK decision has given us a bit of wiggle-room. Let's hope that we use it wisely.

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## LE VICE APPUYÉ AU BRAS DU CRIME PLAN DE PAIX DE TRUMP

Ferry de Kerckhove

La Presse, 11 février 2020

C'est ainsi que Chateaubriand décrivit le claudiquant Talleyrand, ministre des Affaires étrangères de France, s'appuyant sur son ennemi juré, Fouché, ministre de l'Intérieur, quand on les vit entrer ensemble pour saluer le monarque rétabli sur son trône.

Le spectacle de Donald Trump destitué par la Chambre des représentants américaine, et Bibi Nétanyahou, mis en accusation pour une série de turpitudes dans son pays, rivalisait avec cette image historique. Mais la supercherie du soi-disant « plan de paix » frise le crime parfait. Oublions l'évidence de l'absence des principaux intéressés que sont les Palestiniens. Déjà à Madrid en 1991, les Palestiniens n'étaient que des membres de la délégation jordanienne tandis que la plupart des engagements pris dans le cadre des accords d'Oslo en 1993 et 1995 envers les Palestiniens n'ont pas été respectés. La colonisation dans ce qui devrait constituer la Palestine indépendante compte plus de 700 000 colons juifs sur un espace représentant moins de 20 % de ce qui était la Palestine sous mandat britannique à la fin de la Seconde Guerre mondiale.

Les administrations américaines précédentes ont régulièrement déploré la colonisation juive du bout des lèvres mais sans jamais l'empêcher, tandis que les grands cris de condamnation d'Israël par les pays arabes ont progressivement perdu en intensité alors que le spectre d'une montée en puissance de l'Iran les ralliait de plus en plus

ouvertement du côté d'Israël. D'ailleurs, ces pays n'ont jamais répété l'embargo pétrolier de 1973 contre les États-Unis après l'appui de ces derniers à Israël dans la guerre du Yom Kippour, et de nos jours, les États-Unis ne subiraient aucun impact d'un embargo.

L'ironie aujourd'hui, c'est que seul l'Iran défend la cause des Palestiniens, non tant pour ces derniers mais bien plus pour humilier les pays arabes.

Maître du jeu, Trump, au service de Nétanyahou, outre un coup de pouce majeur à son endroit à la veille de la troisième élection en Israël en un an, lui a offert dans ce plan de paix tout et même plus que ce qu'il pouvait rêver d'obtenir : la légitimation de toutes les colonies en Cisjordanie avec la promesse que personne ne serait chassé de son habitat, le contrôle de la rive gauche du Jourdain, quatre ans de négociation sans échanges de territoire contrairement à ce qui avait été envisagé entre Arafat et Olmert en 2008 pour compenser l'impact des colonies israéliennes en Cisjordanie, l'illusion du doublement du territoire palestinien par le truchement de banderoles de territoires au sud du désert du Negev, certains restant sous contrôle israélien, créant un pays désarticulé, avec un tunnel pour rejoindre Gaza.

## JÉRUSALEM

Jérusalem reste la capitale indivise d'Israël, tandis que les Palestiniens, un peu comme la papauté à Rome mais dans des conditions moins avantageuses, auront leur capitale le plus au bord possible de Jérusalem-Est. Tout cela pour 50 milliards de dollars si Hamas cesse d'être Hamas – ce qui ne serait pas un mal, que les Palestiniens renoncent au terrorisme sous toutes ses formes, qu'ils n'aient pas d'armée et qu'ils acceptent la notion d'Israël, nation juive, évidemment au détriment des Palestiniens israéliens.

Le fameux droit de retour revendiqué par les Palestiniens pour les descendants de leurs ancêtres chassés en 1947 est liquidé une bonne fois pour toutes.

Il est évident que ce plan est inacceptable pour les Palestiniens et, beaucoup plus dommage, c'est qu'il ne constitue pas une base de négociation. Pourtant, la nécessité d'un accord réel est plus indispensable que jamais, indépendamment de toutes les résolutions des Nations unies bafouées par Israël depuis 1947. Les Palestiniens ont droit à un État réel, et les Israéliens, engoncés dans leur sentiment de sécurité, ne peuvent ignorer que faute d'un État distinct, un jour, les « arabes » seront majoritaires dans l'espace total sous contrôle israélien, vivant dans une forme d'apartheid dont personne ne veut mais qui, de jour en jour, devient une réalité criante.

Le plan Trump n'est pas une garantie de sécurité pour Israël et, même si les pays arabes se sentent stratégiquement proches de l'État juif pour l'instant, ils auront du mal à cautionner un plan de paix aussi désastreux. S'ils le font quand même, le désespoir palestinien risque de déclencher une troisième Intifada plus virulente et meurtrière que les précédentes, retardant une fois de plus la véritable destinée d'Israël qui est de devenir le moteur de la croissance et de la stabilité au Moyen-Orient.

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Enough is enough. Clear the blockades, restore the rule of law

Derek H. Burney

National Post, February 17, 2020

Dialogue is no prescription for those who refuse to listen because they believe themselves to be custodians of the only truth

It is times like this when Lucien Bouchard's claim that "Canada is not a real country" has an eerie ring of truth. Protesters of many stripes have the upper hand in pockets of the country. The rule of law has been parked in the cupboard. Rail lines are blockaded and services suspended. A provincial legislature was shuttered. The country's economy is crippled. The national interest has no defender. The preferred solution is not a return to order and apprehension of the offenders. Rather it is "dialogue" — as remote and amorphous a prescription as the lowest form of sophistry; one that often can be a euphemism for vacillation and the evasion of responsibility.

A government that seems incapable of enforcing the rule of law or asserting the national interest has lost the will to govern. It has effectively ceded the right to govern. Dialogue is no prescription for those who refuse to listen because they believe themselves to be custodians of the only truth. They break the laws of the land with abandon, certain that they will face no consequences. Many of their complaints have been addressed extensively by the courts and by the responsible regulatory agencies and have been endorsed by duly elected band councils. Yet nothing but abject capitulation is what is being demanded.

Grievances of many kinds — a few of which may have strands of legitimacy — are used to justify what we are witnessing in various parts of the country, vestiges of mob rule— the antithesis of democratic values we supposedly cherish. Opposition to pipelines — the safest and most efficient means for transporting oil and gas — has gone from irrational to hysterical. Our competitors in the U.S. and Australia, among others, can barely suppress outright laughter as they watch the folly of Canada strangling the livelihood of hundreds of thousands of its citizens who prefer to work rather than to protest. India and China mock us openly by plowing ahead with increased coal production while espousing empty commitments to the Paris Accord.

Abetted by too many who are responsible for education in this country, the vilification of our resource base and support for fanciful climate-change "aspirations" march in tandem. But to what end? Can the 1.4 per cent Canadian tail really wag the global dog? Without genuine commitments from the major polluters, the climate-change crusade is rapidly becoming a fool's game.

The words on the Peace Tower carry an ominous caution: “When there is no vision, the people perish.” Today, we have neither vision nor leadership. Instead of a clear sense of direction, we wallow in save-the-world mantras and mythologies. Instead of leadership, we hear feckless platitudes. Our law enforcement agencies are idled, awaiting the direction no one in government seems willing to give. In the absence of firm political leadership, fingers are pointed everywhere except where they belong.

A minority government should not mean that we have no government. So, when Parliament reconvenes after yet another “break,” our Prime Minister returned after yet another junket, will there be a call for action? Don’t hold your breath. Perversely, the tolerance for inaction in Canada seems to be at an all-time high.



Canada's Indigenous Services Minister Marc Miller after meeting with representatives of the Mohawk Nation at the site of a rail stoppage on Tyendinaga Mohawk Territory, as part of a protest against British Columbia's Coastal GasLink pipeline, in Tyendinaga, Ontario, Canada February 15, 2020. *REUTERS/Carlos Osorio*

We are slip-sliding towards a national paralysis with the same degree of complacency and indulgence that brought us to this self-made crisis — policies that have stunted our competitiveness, set region against region, hollowed out our global image and left us squabbling over peripheral issues. The most precious elements of our existence atrophy from sheer neglect.

The priorities for any Canadian government are national unity, prosperity and security. We are lagging on all three. Tensions are smouldering in western Canada as efforts to develop their major energy resource are negated or stymied by oppressive regulations and malign neglect. Our economy is anemic, and our security is compromised by the unwillingness of those who purport to govern to uphold the law. Before we try to save the planet, we need urgently to refurbish the national fabric.

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## Canada and USMCA: An Unexpected Success Story

John M. Weekes

Brink, January 24, 2020

One year ago, I contributed [an article to BRINK](#) that began with the comment, “From a Canadian business perspective, restoring a more certain trade environment in North America is at the top of any wish list for 2019.” By that measure, 2019 was very successful.

In late May, Canada and the United States reached an agreement whereby the United States removed the tariffs on steel and aluminum imports from Canada, which had been imposed ostensibly for national security reasons under Section 232. At the same time, Canada removed all tariffs on American imports that had been imposed as retaliation against the 232 action. A similar deal was reached between Mexico and the United States.

### **Restoration of Sanity**

This development marked a restoration of sanity to the management of North American trade relations and was greeted with relief in Canada and by most Americans. A year ago, the larger drama surrounding the fate of the new NAFTA, the USMCA, remained uncertain. The general view seemed to be that the Democrats who had taken control of the House of Representatives in the midterm elections were hostile to the USMCA and would not be willing to give President Trump a “victory” as he prepared to seek a second term.

However, as spring turned to summer, it was becoming clear that many Democrats and, importantly, Speaker Nancy Pelosi were interested in trying to find a way to a “yes” on the agreement. Just as important, the administration was prepared to work with the Democrats to address specific concerns they had raised about the USMCA.

At the same time, Robert Lighthizer, the American trade representative, was engaged in parallel discussions with his counterparts in Canada and Mexico. The result of all these efforts was the signing on December 10 by the three countries of [an amending](#)

protocol that revised (what we call in Canada) the Canada-United States-Mexico Agreement (CUSMA) and put it on a clear path toward ratification.

### **Sudden Outbreak of Bipartisanship**

What followed was even more astonishing.

On December 19, the day after voting to impeach President Donald Trump, the House of Representatives voted overwhelmingly by 385-41 to approve the USMCA and enact the implementing bill. Notably, 193 Democrats and 192 Republicans voted in favor.

Such massive and bipartisan support for a trade agreement has not been seen since the passage of implementing legislation for the Tokyo Round of GATT negotiations in 1979. The Senate predictably also approved the USMCA by 89 to 10 on January 16. The strength of political support in the United States for the new NAFTA augurs well for the future of trade cooperation in North America.

The Mexican Senate easily ratified the amending protocol in December. This now leaves Canada as the only country not to have ratified the agreement.

*Although the situation for the USMCA looks a lot better than it did 12 months ago, there are still some dark clouds on the horizon.*

### **When Will Canada Ratify?**

Securing ratification in Canada should, however, be relatively easy. At the end of May, the Canadian government introduced implementing legislation in the Canadian Parliament but made clear that Canada did not intend to get ahead of the United States and that passage of the legislation in Canada would need to await action by the U.S. 2019 was a federal election year in Canada.

So when Parliament was dissolved for the October 21 election, all pending legislation died on the order paper. In the election, Prime Minister Justin Trudeau's Liberals were rebuked by the voters and lost their majority, but Prime Minister Trudeau, as leader of the party with the most seats, retained his job as prime minister.

On January 21, Prime Minister Trudeau told the press that the government would submit draft legislation to provide for the implementation of the USMCA immediately after Parliament resumes sitting on January 27.

### **Support for the Democrats' Changes**

Some criticism of how the government managed the negotiations can be expected from the opposition parties, but no party has a serious interest in trying to scuttle the deal. Expect ratification in Canada to occur well before Easter.

Importantly, the changes to the USMCA resulting from the administration's negotiations with House Democrats are viewed very favorably in Canada.

Canadian negotiators led by Deputy Prime Minister Chrystia Freeland had sought to strengthen the dispute settlement system in a similar fashion to what the Democrats

achieved. Most Canadians are supportive of the strengthened provisions on labor and the environment. And finally there was virtually no support in Canada for lengthening the duration of the protection for biologic drugs; indeed the government had opposed this proposal by the U.S. administration.

So the situation looks a lot better than it did 12 months ago. However, there are still some dark clouds on the horizon.

### **WTO Reform Moving Up the Agenda**

The Appellate Body at the WTO has ceased to function because the United States has not allowed new judges to be appointed over concerns about how the body has operated. The WTO remains important even for Canada-U.S. trade and the uncertainty resulting from this development is damaging.

The Phase I agreement between the U.S. and China has helped calm markets, but the purchase commitments made by China will unfortunately erode export prospects to China for Canadian producers of the products covered by the deal. Furthermore, on the face of it, these commitments would seem to be a violation of the most favored nation provision of GATT Article I.

On a more positive note, the U.S. administration is taking a larger role in promoting WTO reform. A good example is the January 14 Joint Statement of the Trilateral Meeting of the Trade Ministers of Japan, the United States and the European Union calling for strengthening WTO rules on industrial subsidies. Finally, it is hard to overestimate the importance of the strong bipartisan support given by Congress to the USMCA. This shows that the U.S. can negotiate and implement major modern trade agreements. This development should send a positive signal to other countries contemplating whether or not to engage in negotiations with the United States.



### **A Tepid Response to Taiwan's defence of Democracy**

Hugh Stephens

Ottawa Citizen, February 4, 2020

Most western nations responded with enthusiasm to a clean and fair election. Canada's government barely managed anonymous congratulations on Facebook.

Last month, Taiwan held its seventh free and open presidential election, along with elections to its legislature, the Legislative Yuan.

The incumbent, 53-year-old Dr. Tsai Ing-wen, Taiwan's first and only female president, was returned with a record 8.2 million votes, winning 57 per cent of the popular vote and handily beating her main rival, Kuomintang (KMT) candidate Han Kuo-yu. Tsai's party, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), retained its majority in the legislature. Voter turnout was 75 per cent, and despite the ongoing threat of military force by China and reported attempts by China to disrupt the elections through social media manipulation, all went smoothly, peacefully, respectfully and without incident.

Tsai's convincing win can be attributed to China, even though Beijing preferred the more compliant KMT to win the presidency and take control of the legislature. Given Tsai's plummeting popularity in 2018 – halfway through her first term – owing to a number of fumbled domestic files such as pension and labour reform, a KMT win at that time looked like a real possibility. But in a major speech in 2019 to mark the 40th anniversary of a call from Beijing to end military confrontation across the Taiwan Strait, Chinese President Xi Jinping trumpeted “one country, two systems” as the solution to the standoff between Beijing and Taipei – while threatening the use of force as a final resort.

Shortly after that, the wheels began to fall off the “one country, two systems” solution. In Hong Kong, a million people took to the streets to protest Beijing's interference and manipulation of the “one country, two systems” framework there, followed by heavy-handed police suppression of many of the demonstrations. This was a gift to Tsai's party, which was seen by the electorate as the best choice to stand up for Taiwan's autonomy. In her victory speech, Tsai referred to “one country, two systems” as “entirely unacceptable” for Taiwan, but noted that she was committed to peaceful and stable cross-strait relations.

China's reaction to Tsai's re-election was predictable. The state-owned media organ, Xinhua, claimed she used “dirty tactics” such as cheating, repression and intimidation to get votes, and blamed anti-China political forces in the West. But how did other countries react?

U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo tweeted that “the U.S. congratulates Dr. Tsai Ing-wen on her re-election ... Taiwan once again demonstrates the strength of its robust democratic system.” Japanese Foreign Minister Motegi Toshimitsu said that “the government of Japan congratulates the smooth implementation of the democratic election and Ms. Tsai on her victory again.” United Kingdom Foreign Secretary Dominic Raab extended “warm congratulations to the people of Taiwan on the smooth conduct of the elections and to Dr. Tsai Ing-wen and her party on her re-election.” Australia's Foreign Affairs and Trade website noted that “Australia congratulates Dr. Tsai Ing-wen and her party on her re-election ... Australia also congratulates the people of Taiwan on the peaceful exercise of their democratic rights.”

And how about Canada?

Canada managed to issue a statement on Facebook through the Canadian Trade Office in Taipei, Canada's unofficial representative office in Taiwan, a bland statement not attributed to any particular individual, let alone anyone in Canada. “Canada

congratulates the people of Taiwan for the recent election.” That’s it. No mention of who won, no mention of Dr. Tsai, no mention of how the elections were conducted.



**Supporters of Tsai Ing-Wen and the Democratic Progressive Party wave flags and banners during a rally as the results of the presidential elections are announced on Jan. 11 in Taipei. CARL COURT / GETTY IMAGES**

The statement did go on to talk about strengthening people-to-people relationships and trade and investment ties between Canada and Taiwan, as indeed did statements by other countries. But in terms of a congratulatory message, it was pretty tepid. And in comparison with other national statements, it stands out as overly cautious, “politically correct” to a fault, and frankly, disappointing.

Canada, of course, adheres to the “one China” principle, as do almost all other countries, recognizing Beijing as the sole government of China. Does that include Taiwan? According to Beijing it does, and Canada “took note” of Beijing’s claims to Taiwan as part of the formula leading to recognition of the People’s Republic of China in 1970. (Taking note means neither accepting nor challenging Beijing’s position.) That formula nonetheless gives countries that recognize Beijing considerable leeway in dealing with Taiwan, which has all the attributes of an autonomous state and is a member of both the WTO and APEC. “Unofficial” ties with Taiwan are not precluded, non-diplomatic representative offices have been established, and senior officials, indeed ministerial-level officials, have been known to make “private” visits. Canada has been careful not to

be at the cutting edge of developing relations with Taiwan (fair enough – leave that to the U.S.), but it is not even in the middle of the pack, as the comparison of congratulatory messages clearly shows. We lag, and it is noticed.

There is no need to gratuitously offend China – we have enough bilateral issues as it is – but there is also no need to refrain from fully exploiting our ability to support the values we profess to stand for by extending some explicit moral support to the people of Taiwan and those whom they have freely elected. There is also the advancement of Canada’s larger economic and security interests in the Asia Pacific to consider. More active engagement with Taiwan would help expand bilateral trade and investment, while from a security perspective, maintenance of the status quo in the Taiwan Strait is a key objective. One opportunity currently under study in Ottawa is encouraging Taiwan’s membership in the new CPTPP trade bloc, a move that is fully consistent with Canada’s one-China commitments.

Congratulatory messages are generally formulaic, but words count, especially in the current circumstances when the people of Taiwan have stood up for their rights and pushed back against intimidation and electoral meddling. Canada needs to do better in terms of its messaging if we really want people in the region to take us seriously.

Fortunately, Canada has recently stood up for Taiwan’s participation in the World Health Organization with respect to global deliberations on control of the coronavirus despite Chinese opposition. Practical co-operation on global issues, such as health pandemics, should trump political considerations concerning nomenclature and claims of jurisdiction.

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## To win a UN Security Council seat, Canada needs to compete hard

Colin Robertson  
Globe and Mail, January 30, 2020

What does the world really think of Canada? We will get one answer this June when the United Nations’ 193 members elect new non-permanent Security Council members.

Canada, Ireland and Norway are competing within our regional grouping for two seats with two-year terms beginning in January, 2021. Winners require two-thirds of the votes cast.

With five months left, it’s an open race, although some think Canada will lose. We started later than Norway and Ireland. Both have good campaigns.

Norway’s development assistance consistently averages 1 per cent of gross national income (GNI) – well above the 0.7-per-cent UN target. The Norwegian government’s recent paper on multilateralism is compelling and articulate. Ireland’s A Better World development strategy is also first-class. Emphasizing gender equality, climate action, governance and humanitarian need, it commits Ireland to achieve the 0.7-per-

cent target by 2030. Irish aid is currently about 0.4 per cent. The Irish celebrate their neutrality but participate in peace operations; Ireland currently fields 623 peacekeepers while Norway deploys 135 and Canada 45. The Irish have also enlisted U2's Bono in its bid to secure a seat.

While Canada ranks with Norway among the top 10 givers of humanitarian assistance, that aid represents just 0.26 per cent of GNI. Canada's detailed election platform for the UN seat focuses on climate change, gender equality, peace, economic security and multilateralism. It builds on our 2018 G7 Charlevoix summit program.

The last time Canada ran for a seat, we lost to Germany and Portugal. Until then, we had run and won in every decade since 1946. Losing in 2010 was rationalized as the Stephen Harper government's lacklustre campaign. They were ambivalent about the UN, taking perverse pride in the mantra "we don't just go along to get along."

We are in this race because Prime Minister Justin Trudeau wanted it. What better way to demonstrate that "Canada is back?"

To win, Mr. Trudeau needs to campaign hard. Where he cannot go, he should send our former prime ministers and governors-general, former ambassadors and internationalists. We should set a date by which we will meet the 0.7-per-cent GDP development targets and make the proposed Canadian Centre for Peace, Order and Good Government a funding vehicle for our effective but impoverished development non-governmental organizations (NGOs).

A total of 129 votes are needed to win. We need to tie down the 33 votes from Latin America and the Caribbean, go after the 54 votes from Africa as well as the 53 votes from Asia and the Pacific. The Norwegians and Irish probably have most of Western Europe's 28 votes, while the 23 from Eastern Europe are problematic. We need to cultivate our fellow members of the Commonwealth (52 votes) and la Francophonie (74 votes). While our support for Israel may deter some Muslim nations (50 votes), others are impressed by our work on behalf of the Rohingya and our refugee resettlement.

The recent African visits by Foreign Minister François-Philippe Champagne, International Development Minister Karina Gould and other officials need to be part of an ongoing engagement with this often "forgotten" continent. A tour before June by Mr. Trudeau should be part of the strategy, to coincide with the port visits of HMCS Shawinigan and Glace Bay.

The ground game at the UN counts because the vote is secret and cast by each nation's ambassador. Personal relationships among the envoys matter. Canada's ambassador, Marc-André Blanchard, is respected, but so is Ireland's Geraldine Byrne Nason and Norway's Mona Juul. Ms. Juul was elected in July to lead the UN's central platform for development.

Scholar Adam Chapnick's Canada on the UN Security Council should be read by our campaign team. It is filled with useful insights into previous campaigns and Security

Council experience. Beating the drum in Ottawa, for example, helps keep the foreign diplomatic corps informed and raises Canadian awareness. Mr. Chapnick warns, however, that by personalizing the current campaign, Justin Trudeau risks making it partisan when what we need is an all-Canada effort.

And if we win? Our traditional role is that of the helpful fixer, and it is necessary. A seat will also give us ongoing access to the Chinese and Russians, which can help defrost these relationships.

A seat will require more resources – people and money – for diplomacy and development. We need embassies in hot spots such as Pyongyang and Tehran. Diplomatic relations are not a housekeeping seal of approval but the practical means for conducting business. The Iranian plane-crash tragedy is a reminder of the utility of having diplomats in difficult places.

Losing in 2020 would be traumatic for the Trudeau government and a rude shock to Canadians' international self-image. We need to put our campaign into high gear and make it an all-Canada effort.

What does the world really think of Canada? We will get one answer this June when the United Nations' 193 members elect new non-permanent Security Council members.

Canada, Ireland and Norway are competing within our regional grouping for two seats with two-year terms beginning in January, 2021. Winners require two-thirds of the votes cast.

With five months left, it's an open race, although some think Canada will lose. We started later than Norway and Ireland. Both have good campaigns.

Norway's development assistance consistently averages 1 per cent of gross national income (GNI) – well above the 0.7-per-cent UN target. The Norwegian government's recent paper on multilateralism is compelling and articulate. Ireland's A Better World development strategy is also first-class. Emphasizing gender equality, climate action, governance and humanitarian need, it commits Ireland to achieve the 0.7-per-cent target by 2030. Irish aid is currently about 0.4 per cent. The Irish celebrate their neutrality but participate in peace operations; Ireland currently fields 623 peacekeepers while Norway deploys 135 and Canada 45. The Irish have also enlisted U2's Bono in its bid to secure a seat.

While Canada ranks with Norway among the top 10 givers of humanitarian assistance, that aid represents just 0.26 per cent of GNI. Canada's detailed election platform for the UN seat focuses on climate change, gender equality, peace, economic security and multilateralism. It builds on our 2018 G7 Charlevoix summit program.

The last time Canada ran for a seat, we lost to Germany and Portugal. Until then, we had run and won in every decade since 1946. Losing in 2010 was rationalized as the Stephen

Harper government's lacklustre campaign. They were ambivalent about the UN, taking perverse pride in the mantra "we don't just go along to get along."

We are in this race because Prime Minister Justin Trudeau wanted it. What better way to demonstrate that "Canada is back?"

To win, Mr. Trudeau needs to campaign hard. Where he cannot go, he should send our former prime ministers and governors-general, former ambassadors and internationalists. We should set a date by which we will meet the 0.7-per-cent GDP development targets and make the proposed Canadian Centre for Peace, Order and Good Government a funding vehicle for our effective but impoverished development non-governmental organizations (NGOs).

A total of 129 votes are needed to win. We need to tie down the 33 votes from Latin America and the Caribbean, go after the 54 votes from Africa as well as the 53 votes from Asia and the Pacific. The Norwegians and Irish probably have most of Western Europe's 28 votes, while the 23 from Eastern Europe are problematic. We need to cultivate our fellow members of the Commonwealth (52 votes) and la Francophonie (74 votes). While our support for Israel may deter some Muslim nations (50 votes), others are impressed by our work on behalf of the Rohingya and our refugee resettlement.

The recent African visits by Foreign Minister François-Philippe Champagne, International Development Minister Karina Gould and other officials need to be part of an ongoing engagement with this often "forgotten" continent. A tour before June by Mr. Trudeau should be part of the strategy, to coincide with the port visits of HMCS Shawinigan and Glace Bay.

The ground game at the UN counts because the vote is secret and cast by each nation's ambassador. Personal relationships among the envoys matter. Canada's ambassador, Marc-André Blanchard, is respected, but so is Ireland's Geraldine Byrne Nason and Norway's Mona Juul. Ms. Juul was elected in July to lead the UN's central platform for development.

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## Derek Burney: Forget the Security Council

Canada's diplomatic efforts would be better spent elsewhere

Derek H. Burney

The National Post, February 6, 2020

Canada is expending a good deal of diplomatic, ministerial and prime ministerial lobbying efforts trying to win a non-permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council. But should we? Can anyone cite a recent example of a Security Council success on a major global issue? The truth is that the Security Council is anything but a hotbed of activity or inspiration on the global scene. It's more notable for the crises it avoids than those it gets involved with.

The torpor of a bloated bureaucracy is not the only reason the UN has become less relevant. Regional quotas are often the predominant determinants for choosing candidates for senior positions. But it is the member states themselves, notably the five veto-carrying permanent members of the council, that are responsible for the lack of resolve on such crises as those in Syria, Yemen, Iran and Myanmar.

The sharp ideological divide among the five permanent members blocks consensus. The decline of U.S. interest in, if not commitment to, the UN under the Trump administration is another factor. Washington's most notable interventions of late have been rearguard actions to fend off anti-Israel manoeuvres at the UN. The vetoes and the rhetoric are usually commendable, but carry little practical value. Meanwhile, the U.S. continues to shoulder roughly 22 per cent of the UN's operating budget, but one can only wonder what may happen if U.S. President Donald Trump wins a second term.

When Canada was on the Security Council from 1989 to 1990, in the wake of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, there was unusual consensus on a resolution supporting the first Gulf War. The Soviet Union was imploding and had no inclination to block the military action. China, presumably concerned about access to Mideast oil, chose to abstain. (Yemen and Cuba registered the only negative votes.) At that time, the Mulroney

government urged the Bush administration to seek a UN mandate for military intervention and our UN ambassador, Yves Fortier, lobbied eloquently to muster support.

This was only the second time in UN history that a resolution authorized the use of force to repel aggression — a unique, unipolar moment in history that allowed the Security Council to function as it should. But, with the rise of China and a reassertive Russia, the Security Council has returned to a state of gridlock. In fact, as U.S. interest subsides, China is actively underwriting many UN peacekeeping operations, especially in Africa. The global power balance is shifting.

The most persistent blockers of Security Council consensus — Russia and China — both openly flout the founding principles of the UN: Russia, by its military intervention in Crimea and Ukraine, and China, with its detention of three million Uyghurs in what are generally regarded as concentration camps. Yet neither suffers from any serious sanctions or retribution from the UN.

Can anyone cite a recent example of a Security Council success on a major global issue?

Canada had been accustomed to winning a Security Council seat every decade until the Harper government lost in 2010. Many concluded that our effort had been half-hearted and the Liberals promised during the 2015 election to put more effort into winning the next time around. They are delivering on that promise, but the outcome is anything but assured. Our candidacy this time is handicapped in many ways. We belong to the Western European and Other Group (WEOG), but the former greatly outnumber the latter and, not surprisingly, our two competitors are both Western European — Ireland and Norway. Both are mounting very effective campaigns.

Canada may be the ninth-largest contributor to the UN (2.73 per cent of the total \$5.6-billion budget), but Ireland and Norway excel where it counts: Ireland is one of the highest per capita contributors to peacekeeping (previously a badge of honour for Canada), while Norway leads the pack on aid, contributing 0.94 per cent of its gross national income, compared with Canada's 0.28 per cent.

We can probably count on support from European stalwarts like the United Kingdom and Holland, but many of the other European countries are more likely to vote for one of their regional compatriots. The biggest block of votes are in Africa, but Canada's greatly reduced aid budget has not won us many friends on that continent. Strained relations with China will not help us much in Africa or Asia. And Saudi Arabia and its allies will not likely be in our camp.

The structure of the Security Council is badly in need of reform. Countries like Japan, Germany, India and Brazil clamour for permanent seats and they each have a legitimate claim. African nations want a seat for their continent. By joining the "uniting for

consensus” group, Canada endorsed an expansion of the council to 25 members, but, by resisting any increase in veto-holding permanent members, it managed to alienate many of the other countries that are seeking reform. The reasoning was impeccable: former deputy foreign minister and current clerk of the Privy Council, Ian Shugart, acknowledged that the Security Council “is often seen as failing to effectively respond to pressing international crises.” While true, saying so is perhaps not helpful to a membership campaign.

While noble and necessary, UN reform is the ultimate oxymoron. Gaining consensus from 200 disparate members, several of whom are in direct contravention of UN principles, is regrettably an exercise in futility.

And Canada has other, more pressing foreign policy priorities — such as freeing the two Canadians incarcerated on dubious grounds in Beijing and obtaining suitable compensation for the families of the Canadian victims of Iran’s missile attack on a Ukrainian aircraft. Pressing for a Security Council seat may be an effort in feel-good diplomacy, but what exactly would it do to advance Canada’s global interests?

Our G7 membership, our position in NATO and our trade agreements offer much more tangible outlets for influence. We could also better allocate our financial commitment to the UN, to ensure our funds are directed toward agencies and activities that are having a positive effect.

Foreign Minister François-Philippe Champagne defended our Security Council campaign last month and spoke confidently about our prospects, saying that the “world wants to see more of Canada.” This is a soothing sentiment to be sure, even if it’s devoid of evidence. Some Canadians prefer to perpetuate the dream of the UN’s potential, rather than confront the reality of its growing irrelevance. If the minister is right, the campaign will have been worthwhile. But if he is wrong and Canada loses again, it should be a wake-up call for us to recalibrate our diplomatic priorities.

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## The Good, the Bad and the Ugly at Global Affairs Canada

Dan Livermore

CIPS Blog, February 12, 2020

The government also seems committed to letting ministers do their jobs, although the instinctive urge for Prime Minister’s Office to exercise control will prove hard to shed. The implications of these changes for Global Affairs Canada (GAC) come in a package that is good, bad and ugly at the same time.

The good news is that GAC has a new, dynamic, talented Foreign Minister, committed to the job. François-Philippe Champagne will not be a name known to most Canadians, certainly not to Anglophones. His emergence from the business world to the front

bench of Liberal ranks has been quick. In two months the fluently trilingual (English, French and Italian) member from Shawinigan has made a notable impact as an able communicator of Canadian views, from the Huawei challenge to global health issues. Within GAC, in which Champagne shifted ministerial portfolios, from International Trade to Foreign Affairs, he has already reinforced a strong reputation for policy work and as a “quick study” on new issues. In contrast to a predecessor that was rarely in her office and not inclined to policy discussions, Champagne is present, visible and active. He also seems to relish foreign policy challenges, at a time when Canadian views are long on platitudes but short of strategic sense, from Russia to the Middle East, to the challenge of China.

This dollop of good news has to be balanced against the bad news, which comes in a pair of core conundrums. The first is a mandate letter that touches the rhetorical bases but lacks a real appreciation of Canada’s current standing in the world and is virtually silent on the dangers of a global leadership vacuum in the age of Trump. Presumably, a classified version of the mandate letter is franker, filling in the blank spaces. If not, it’s Champagne’s job to put some analytical muscle on these issues over the next few years and develop strategies that will safeguard Canadian interests at a time of doubt and dangerous drift.

#### Mismanagement of human resources for two decades has destroyed much of the Canadian foreign service

The second part of the bad news conundrum is GAC’s continuing weakness in its ability to deliver on its core mandate. The problem isn’t funding; it’s the Department’s byzantine structure and management incompetence, which defy almost any modern precepts of public administration. Mismanagement of human resources for two decades has destroyed much of the Canadian foreign service, and GAC now finds itself weak on analytical capacity, woefully lacking in linguistic and regional expertise, and virtually incapacitated by a propensity for endless meetings, consultations and discussions, where issues are talked to death without decisions.



François-Philippe Champagne (Open Canada: Fair Use)

It's difficult to task Champagne to place Canada at the forefront of global governance when GAC can't even govern itself. The Minister needs to act on this public service disaster, possibly with the help of the relevant House of Commons and Senate committees, possibly with outside assistance. In all fairness, GAC shares many of the problems of Canada's current public service. But that's also the most important reason for not relying on public service to sort this out itself.

It's difficult to task Champagne to place Canada at the forefront of global governance when GAC can't even govern itself.

The ugly part of Canadian foreign policy is the component in the mandate letter giving the Foreign Minister leadership of "Canada's United Nations Security Council campaign." The authors of the mandate letter knew by mid-2019 that the Canadian bid for a Council seat, at an election in a few months' time, was in serious trouble, largely as a consequence of inactivity and inattention during the Government's first mandate. Canada now finds itself a long way back, third place in a three-country race for two seats (with Norway and Ireland as our opponents).

The most sensible option in November 2019, was to pull Canada out of the race. A plausible explanation was then available: given its minority situation, the Government would focus its energies on domestic issues, leaving its Council bid for the future. With that option discarded, the Government has essentially rolled the dice, hoping either that

it can pull a rabbit out of the hat, or that a defeat will not damage its standing among Canadians.

Champagne has responded by doing the right things, seizing the Security Council candidacy with an energy lacking in the Government's first term. The Prime Minister has also rolled up his sleeves, somewhat belatedly. Yet a real question is whether GAC or the Government is armed with the right tools to win an election. These campaigns aren't popularity contests, and issues like aid programs, voting records, or an embassy presence were precisely where the Harper Government stumbled in 2010. Does GAC have the dexterity to repair our reputation in Africa or among Middle East states? Does the Government have the will to back this campaign with action? And can any of this be done in three to four months?

For the first time since the Second World War, Canada can't count on many friends abroad.

If Canada loses the election, Champagne will be stuck with the communications fall-out. But he has inherited an albatross bought by someone else.

The new Foreign Minister already knows that Canada's real foreign policy challenges aren't to be found in his mandate letter nor the Security Council campaign, win or lose. For the first time since the Second World War, Canada can't count on many friends abroad. We have poor relations with Russia, Saudi Arabia, India, Iran and Venezuela, at a time when the United States has vacated its global leadership role, Britain is searching for a new international vocation, and key countries of the European Union are absorbed with their own regional problems. These are challenges of a magnitude never seen before, and they won't be addressed by the bland words and minor institution-building suggested in the mandate letter, nor by the calls for a foreign policy review now hitting the media. What is required is steady, determined and imaginative stewardship at a time when there are lots of pot-holes dotting the Canadian foreign policy landscape. Champagne can make, or break, his name on his success in addressing these challenges.

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## Canada's Role in German Unification

*Excerpted from an address on the 30th anniversary of the conference at the Canadian War Museum, January 23, 2020.*

John J. Noble

Policy Magazine, January 23, 2020

Thirty-one years ago next month, newly inaugurated US President George Bush and his Secretary of State James Baker came to Ottawa on Bush's first visit abroad as President to meet with Prime Minister Brian Mulroney and Foreign Affairs Minister Joe Clark. It

was a cold and blustery day. In what President Bush called a “typical brainstorming session” he indicated he was looking for advice on how to handle East-West relations and on the very divisive debate between the United States and its Western European allies about short range nuclear weapons (SNF) – the kind that were stationed in West Germany and because of their limited range, if ever used, would also detonate on West and East German soil. With stirrings of glasnost and perestroika coming from Moscow and the successful ratification of the INF Treaty in 1988 (which called for the destruction of all missiles and cruise missiles with a range of between 500 and 5,500 kilometres within three years), there was considerable domestic pressure on the German and other Western European governments to do something about the short range weapons.

Clark told Baker that Canada favoured negotiations on SNF but not their total elimination. Mulroney suggested Bush do a trip to Eastern Europe armed with a comprehensive plan for dealing with the area. Clark reminded them that West Germany was still the key in the public relations war and the West was losing there. The same day Canada and the U.S. signed an agreement to test the Advanced Cruise Missile over Canadian territory. It had been somewhat controversial in Canada within some circles, but nowhere near as unpopular as testing the cruise missiles had been in 1983. Only 12 protestors showed up outside the Pearson Building. As Director General of the Bureau for International Security and Arms Control, I had a Verification Unit. They, along with military and civilian members of DND, immediately went to work on some ideas which the Canadian Government might propose to Bush. The focus was on a new Open Skies regime which would permit unarmed military aircraft from NATO and the Warsaw Pact to overfly the territory of the other side as a confidence building measure to demonstrate the other side was not engaged in any military buildups. The idea had originally been proposed by President Dwight Eisenhower in the 1950’s, but stalled when the Russians shot down an American U-2 spy plane piloted by Gary Powers. Times had changed since the mid-50’s particularly with the advent of satellites which could provide detailed photography of activity anywhere. However, satellites could not see through clouds, whereas low flying aircraft with infra-red instruments and synthetic aperture radar can.

After discussing our ideas on Open Skies with Deputy Minister Si Taylor and then Joe Clark, I went to Washington in early April to discuss a new Open Skies regime with U.S. officials in the State Department, the National Security Council and the Pentagon and test their interest. It was like pushing on an open door. When PM Mulroney and Clark went to Washington in early May to open the new Canadian Embassy building, they also met with President Bush and Secretary Baker.

Mulroney suggested to Bush that he should propose a new Open Skies regime. He used the arguments prepared for him but added the caution to Bush that if he didn’t make this proposal, then Chairman Gorbachev might. Mulroney also made some suggestions to Bush about how to handle the SNF issue at the NATO Summit in Brussels later that month. In their book *A World Transformed: The Collapse of the Soviet Empire, the Unification of Germany, Tiananmen Square and the Gulf War* President George Bush and Brent Scowcroft (his National Security Advisor) describe their initial reaction to PM Mulroney’s proposal as follows: Scowcroft writes “To me, the Open Skies proposal

smacked of gimmickry, and would wrongly give the impression that we did not have the brain power to think of something innovative and had to reach back 30 years for an idea. After all, we now had satellites to do such surveillance. I lost the argument because I was unable to come up with anything better". That in itself was a compliment to our team's work. Bush wrote "I didn't feel that Open Skies was such a bad idea—it looked like a no-lose proposition from our side. Gorbachev, committed to glasnost, would find it hard from a public-relations view to reject it. It was old hat, but given the new openness offensive by Gorbachev, I thought we had a lot to gain."

Three days later Bush included the Open Skies proposal in his speech to Texas A & M University. It went virtually unnoticed by the American press which prompted Clark to write an op-ed in the New York Times suggesting not to forget Open Skies.

At the NATO Summit the first big issue was SNF. The Germans and many Europeans (except the British) wanted to get rid of the category since it could only be used within Germany. During the debate Mulroney turned to Bush across the table and said "Mr. President I want to remind you of something once said by U.S. Supreme Court Justice Learned Hand: leadership to be effective has to take into account the views of others." You won't find that in Mulroney's Memoirs, but I was the note-taker and included it in my report. The leaders tasked their foreign ministers with coming up with a solution. In a late-night session, there was considerable tension. At one-point German Foreign Minister Genscher, replying to an intervention by Clark, publicly asked "and Joe how many nuclear weapons do you have on Canadian territory?" The impasse was broken when one of Baker's aides (Dennis Ross) came over to Clark and asked him to put his ideas on the table. The key was that there be a negotiation of a "partial reduction", not the elimination, of SNF. Everyone accepted the compromise. Mulroney publicly gave credit to Clark's "deft pen" for finding a solution.

The Summit leaders then unanimously endorsed the idea of Open Skies proposed by Bush. I left almost immediately after the Summit for Budapest, Prague, Warsaw and Moscow to brief my counterparts on the results of the NATO Summit including the SNF debate and the Open Skies idea. The Hungarians were very positive on Open Skies and wanted to be involved in it as a means of demonstrating independence from the USSR. The Czechoslovaks were also open to consider it. But Prague was still a dreary place. While I was there the First Secretary at our Embassy Rob McRae went out for a clandestine dinner with Vaclav Havel. The Poles were fascinated by the SNF debate and that the new U.S. President had actually listened to concerns of his partners. The Soviets were the most sceptical of the idea and wondered why they were hearing about it from Canadians, not Americans. We were able to provide the Soviets with factual responses to all of their questions and thereby establish that this was a serious proposal designed to build confidence on both sides.

By late summer Secretary Baker and his Soviet counterpart Eduard Shevardnadze had agreed that they would come to the start of the Open Skies negotiations. Canada volunteered to host the meeting and Joe Clark sent out invitations for the meeting to take place in Ottawa in mid-February 1990.

Under Lysyshyn's direction, Peter Jones, departmental lawyers and others, including representatives from National Defence, were active in drafting basic principles for an Open Skies regime which could be presented to the NATO Foreign Ministers Meeting in December. The Berlin Wall fell on November 9, 1989. On November 20 Mulroney went to Moscow for a four-hour discussion with Gorbachev during which he delivered a private message from President Bush that Bush would "not posture on the Wall" or as Fen Hampson records it in his Mulroney book *Master of Persuasion* "not milk the fall of the wall at Gorbachev's expense." Mulroney debriefed Bush in person on his discussions with Gorbachev prior to Bush's meeting with him in Malta in early December 1989. He told Bush he had detected "an overwhelming hatred among the Soviets for the thought of German unification and how Gorbachev had likened it to eating "unripened fruit". There was another NATO Summit in December where Bush debriefed NATO leaders on his Malta Summit with Gorbachev as did Mulroney on his discussions with the Soviet leader. The following week, the Canadian draft on basic principles for an Open Skies regime was approved by the NATO Foreign Ministers, but no one was proposing that German unification be discussed at the Open Skies Conference.

Another trip to Eastern Europe followed to give them our draft principles for an Open Skies regime. While in Budapest the first stirrings of problems in Romania became public. The Hungarians were fully supportive and were selling small pieces of barbed wire from the Iron Curtain which had come down on their border with Austria during the summer as souvenirs. They agreed to allow an unarmed Canadian military aircraft to do a demonstration flight in January before the Conference opened. In Prague the Velvet Revolution was in full force. Vaclav Havel's photo was on every pane of glass on every building. We attended a public demonstration in Wenceslas Square along with thousands of Czechoslovaks. My counterpart was very concerned that his daughter was striking at university. She told him "don't worry Dad, we are going to finish what you didn't do in 1968." They agreed to allow the Canadian demonstration flight to fly across Czechoslovak airspace en route to and from Hungary. The mood in Warsaw had changed too and they wanted to support the Open Skies proposal. By the time we got to Moscow and were having lunch with our Soviet counterparts hosted by Canadian Ambassador Vernon Turner, his wife came in to announce the fall of Ceausescu in Bucharest. The Soviets still worried that the regime would hurt them more than help. But their Foreign Minister had agreed to come and we weren't giving them a take it or leave it text.

Prime Minister Mulroney welcomed the foreign ministers of NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization to their first meeting ever at the Conference opening on February 12. Mulroney and Clark had hosted Jim Baker and Eduard Shevardnadze for breakfast earlier that morning where the German issue was discussed at great length. Mulroney writes in his *Memoirs* that Shevardnadze was: "deeply troubled by German reunification but resigned to it". Neither Baker or Shevardnadze hinted they were about to announce a process for German unification later the next day, probably because they had not yet agreed to do so. German Foreign Minister Hans Dietrich Genscher arrived in Ottawa from Moscow where the idea of German unification had been broached and he debriefed a NATO Ministerial caucus. He had breakfast with PM Mulroney on February 13, where German unification was discussed and Genscher expressed thanks to Mulroney for his

supportive statements. Again, no hint about the Two-plus-Four agreement that would be announced later that day, probably because the six foreign ministers had not yet agreed on a text.

The first major development at the Ministerial discussion was the very public dissolution of the Warsaw Pact as every WTO minister (except perhaps the Bulgarian) took his distance from the Soviets on the Open Skies proposal. The Soviets made a private offer to the Americans on troop reductions in Europe which Jim Baker described privately to Joe Clark as “too good”, but which the Americans would have to accept in an announcement later the next day. At lunch on the second day, Joe Clark learned from British Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd that the Berlin Four (USA, USSR, France and the UK) intended to announce the start of negotiations for German reunification with the two Germanies later that afternoon. (The Two-plus-Four exercise). Clark suggested to Baker that it might be wise to hold a caucus of NATO Ministers to discuss these matters, since German reunification had been part of NATO’s creed since 1955. When the text of the announcement was circulated several NATO ministers, especially the Dutch (Vanden Broeck) and Italian (de Michellis) ministers, complained about exclusion from the “Two-Plus-Four” process. German minister Genscher, who was not there when the discussion began, told them “you are not even in the game”. Clark suggested a break to caucus with Baker who came up to me and admonishly said “and you wanted this meeting”? I replied as a true diplomat “yes and isn’t it better for ministers to get the piss & vinegar out of their systems here rather than back in capitals?” Baker agreed and undertook to promise all NATO Ministers that he would keep them fully informed as the Two-plus-Four talks proceeded. That calmed the NATO ministers as did Baker’s suggestion that Clark announce the American/Soviet agreement on troop reductions in his closing press conference. Thus ended what was probably the most raucous NATO foreign ministers meeting in history. Since the Warsaw Treaty Organization had dissolved in front of our eyes, something I never expected to experience in my lifetime, there would never be another meeting between Warsaw Pact and NATO Foreign Ministers.

Clark sent a memo to Mulroney outlining what had happened at the NATO Ministerial Meeting during the Open Skies Conference which concluded that prior to Ottawa there was no structure formalizing the involvement of anyone outside of Germany on the unification issue. Ottawa changed that – and that could become the most important accomplishment of the conference (indeed it was). Clark went on “Naturally other countries want into the consultation. Canada does. Some argue that we should protest the Ottawa arrangements because it leaves us out. That would be extremely short-sighted and could undo a very important accomplishment and undermine Canada’s claim to be involved in negotiations respecting Germany. Our standing is high after the conference. Nations around the table appreciated how we defused an ugly atmosphere. To a country they agree that Two-plus-Four is better than the void that existed before Ottawa. Our challenge is to build on the Ottawa agreement – always bearing in mind the extreme sensitivity of the German question. A last comment: we were fortunate to be in the chair. The issues in Europe are so compelling that geographic Europeans are inclined to leave us out. That makes the constancy of our troop commitment all the more important. Chairing puts us at the centre of the action and gives us an unusual

opportunity to influence next steps. As we discussed the CSCE (Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe) holds the best prospects for us. My strong advice is that, if asked, you speak positively about the Two-plus-Four (the Ottawa agreement) as an important step toward the kind of consultation required respecting German unification.” Derek Burney, Mulroney’s former Chief of Staff and then Ambassador in Washington, who was not at the Conference, had a somewhat more jaundiced view of Canada’s exclusion from the Two-plus-Four exercise: he complained bluntly to National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft that “even the piano player in a whore house knows what is going on upstairs.”

The Bush/Scowcroft book outlines in considerable detail how the Administration’s position on German reunification evolved almost daily in the first six weeks of 1990: Scowcroft favoured an NSC idea that would see the two Germanies work out the details of reunification and then present them to the Four Occupying Powers for their blessing. The State Department favoured an approach to allow the two Germanies to work out the internal aspects of reunification with the Four Powers concerned only with the external international aspects of unification. The decision to go with the Two-plus-Four format was made on January 29 when Bush discussed it with British Foreign Secretary Hurd who replied that PM Thatcher favoured a CSCE Summit. Genscher proposed that the two Germanies would determine the extent of some sort of confederation and then take it to the CSCE for approval. On February 2 Genscher accepted the Two-plus-Four formula as long as it was not called “Four-plus-Two” (something the French did call it even after they agreed to Two-plus-Four). Baker discussed the idea with Shevardnadze in Moscow on February 7 where there was disagreement on whether the united Germany would be neutral or part of NATO. Baker raised it with Gorbachev on February 9 and did not receive a definitive reply on whether Gorbachev would accept a unified Germany inside NATO. Scowcroft said he was not certain Kohl fully supported Two-plus-Four. On February 12 Baker came to Ottawa “to try to nail down the Two-Plus-Four formula among the six countries involved. It took “some intensive negotiations in ad hoc meetings” before the six foreign ministers agreed to the Two-plus-Four exercise. So when Douglas Hurd informed Joe Clark about the decision to launch the Two-plus-Four exercise it was almost immediately after it had been agreed. It was not something that had been agreed upon in advance and just formalized at Ottawa.

President Bush spoke with PM Mulroney just before he was to meet Chancellor Kohl at Camp David toward the end of February 1990. PM Mulroney told him he was concerned personally that unification for Germany appeared to be fuelled not just by the legitimate desire of the two states to come together, but by the total collapse of the economy of one state and the economic strength of another. I told Genscher you’re not really talking about a merger here; this is a takeover. Bush then told Mulroney it had been suggested to him that NATO allow Soviet troops to remain in East Germany all the same. That idea angered Mulroney who said “I don’t see how, in fairness, we can accept that,” “The minimum price for German unity should be full German membership in NATO and full support in all the Western organizations and full support for American leadership of the Alliance. I indicated to Genscher and I will tell you: Canada is not renting its seat in Europe. We paid for it. If people want to know how Canada paid for its seat in Europe, they should check out the graves in Belgium, France, Italy and the Netherlands. NATO

got us this far. Solidarity in the Alliance will get us further.” The discussion is reported in Mulroneys’s Memoirs and the Bush Scowcroft book in almost identical terms. Bush added “Mulroneys was right”.

The Two-plus-Four exercise played out with increasing rapidity ending in early October 1990 with German reunification as a full member of NATO.

In Fen Hampson’s 2018 book Master of Persuasion Brian Mulroneys’s Global Legacy there is an introduction from James Baker which notes “Mulroneys’s counsel was helpful as the Berlin Wall came tumbling down and Western allies found themselves divided on the thorny issue of German reunification, which Bush and Mulroneys strongly supported”. Hampson’s book also notes that in November 1993 German Chancellor Helmut Kohl told a Committee of the Bundestag that “Germans will always remember three foreign leaders for their work in assisting their nation’s quest for unity. Looking back, I must name three people who really helped us. I am referring only to Heads of State and Government. There was George Bush, who did not hesitate for one minute when it came to Germany unity. There was Brian Mulroneys. And there was Mikhail Gorbachev.” No greater compliment could have been paid by Chancellor Kohl to Mulroneys. Kohl made no mention of either PM Margaret Thatcher or President Francois Mitterrand who proved to be on the wrong side of history on this issue.

Neither George Bush nor Brian Mulroneys could have imagined what would transpire in the ten months after Mulroneys first proposed the Open Skies idea to Bush in early May 1989. That it all happened without shots being fired (except in Romania) is due in large measure to Bush and Baker having heeded Mulroneys’s advice on the need to take into account the views of others and also to Michael Gorbachev and Helmut Kohl, including the on-going advice offered to all three by Brian Mulroneys.

In 1991 Genscher presented a slab of the Berlin Wall to the Canadian Government as thanks for the role it played in German reunification at the Open Skies Conference. That piece of the wall sat for 18 years in the Government Conference Centre (now the temporary home of the Senate) along with two red and bronze plaques indicating it was a gift from the German Government for the role Canada played in the process of German reunification which started at the Open Skies Conference in the building in 1990. On November 9, 2009 the wall segment was transferred here to the War Museum on the initiative of then PM Harper to serve as a symbol “to honour the men and women of the Canadian Forces who served during that confrontation (the Cold War). It will also complement the memorial to the Victims of Totalitarian Communism, planned for the capital region by Tribute to Liberty.” The War Museum’s blog of October 31, 2009 date obliquely referred to the Open Skies Conference: “The segment of the Wall now at the Canadian War Museum was presented as a gift to the Canadian people by the German government. It was housed for many years in the Government Conference Centre in downtown Ottawa, the site of a 1990 international summit that helped set the framework for peaceful German reunification. The dramatic, graffiti-adorned piece of reinforced concrete was installed in the Centre in 1991.”

On the occasion of the 20 th anniversary of the Open Skies Conference I wrote an op-ed in the Ottawa Citizen in February 2010 which ended by noting “Last November, Prime Minister Stephen Harper announced that the section of the wall would be moved to the War Museum in honour of all those Canadian soldiers who served in Europe during the Cold War. It should also stand in honour of Canadian diplomats who were warriors of a different kind in Europe during the Cold War.” I continue to be of that view, which I know Joe Clark shares. I am glad that the section of the Wall is here in this Museum where it can be seen by many more Canadians than was the case at the Government Conference Centre. But I also think there should be a specific reference to the fact that it was presented to Canada by the Government of Germany because of the role played by Canada in German reunification at the 1990 Open Skies Conference. I checked on the text beside the wall two days ago. It reads as follows: “A Gift to Canada: In 1991 the government of Germany presented this section of the Berlin Wall to Canada. A year earlier, officials from East and West Germany, the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and France had met in Ottawa, where they agreed to a framework for peaceful German reunification”. While not historically inaccurate (except perhaps to call foreign ministers “officials”), it is still missing the real reason why it was presented to Canada.

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## Links

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