

## The Many Stages of Chrystia Freeland

Jeremy Kinsman

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Seeing Deputy Prime Minister Chrystia Freeland on December 10, holding up the just-signed NAFTA II agreement in Mexico City on live television alongside President Manuel López Obrador, towered over by U.S. and Mexican negotiators, was a reminder of how very far she <sup>[1]</sup><sub>[SEP]</sub>has come.

Freeland was named foreign affairs minister in January, 2017 to defend Canada's vital interests against a hostile overturning of the very notion of North American cooperation by Donald Trump.

It was doubtful that anybody else in government had the chops, the knowledge, the chutzpah, and perhaps decisively, the status beyond Canada to effectively counter the bullying, grandstanding, and outright misrepresentation that can characterize White House negotiation in the age of Trump. With a superb professional team, Freeland pulled it off.

As evidence mounted over the course of the last year that the prime minister's judgment could use buttressing from people with significant experience, he called on Chrystia Freeland to step up as a clear number two in the country. He needs her help.

Given that the dangling question—how much farther can she go?—has only one answer, the situation is a bit delicate for both Freeland and Trudeau. In the meantime, it's worthwhile to look back at who she is, where she's from, and what she's done.

I have known Chrystia Freeland since she turned up in Russia 25 years ago as a newbie reporter, stringing out of Kiev in newly independent Ukraine for several A-level UK publications. We first met her for dinner in Moscow at John and Elizabeth Gray's, back when the Globe and Mail and every other Canadian outlet of consequence maintained a Moscow bureau to cover the monumental story of the end of communism, the Cold War, the Soviet Union, and in effect, the 20th century. Canadians, especially—possibly because of the culturally and politically potent Ukrainian-Canadian community—had also to cover the new story of how an independent Ukraine was working out. This bright, Ukrainian-and Russian-

speaking, high-energy, dauntless young woman fresh out of Oxford, a Rhodes Scholar from Alberta, was a real find.

She had come to Kiev to join her mother, Halyna, who was helping the Ukrainians draft their inaugural constitution. Both Chrystia's parents were legal professionals. Halyna was a scholar, who had met Donald Freeland at law school in Edmonton. He is also the son of a lawyer, whose family roots were on a farm in Alberta's Peace River district, though Donald earned his living mostly practising law in the provincial capital. Donald's dad had returned to Peace River from overseas war duty with a war bride from Glasgow. Grandmother Helen dressed Chrystia and her sister in kilts as little girls; Scottish blood mingles with Slavic in those ministerial veins.

But back in Moscow at the Grays, the dinner table talk wasn't about Scotland: it was all Ukraine. Chrystia was trying out the idea, then simmering in Kiev, that maybe Ukraine ought to hold on to its Soviet-legacy nuclear weapons to bargain for air-tight security guarantees from Russia, which clearly had trouble coming to terms with the idea of Ukraine as a separate state, no matter what deal Boris Yeltsin had struck with Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk to bust up the USSR and thereby enable Yeltsin to replace Mikhail Gorbachev. For a Canadian ambassador then in the thick of a massive and costly NATO campaign to help Ukraine and Kazakhstan rid themselves of their worrisome "loose nukes", this was a destabilizing and unwelcome thought.

We settled warily but amicably, and parted as new friends. Ukraine did become officially a non-nuclear weapons state, and Chrystia soon after joined the swelling crowd of Westerners in Moscow, hired as a reporter by the Financial Times. John Lloyd, who was the FT's Moscow bureau chief recalls "It was very clear she was bright, driven to get the story right, always after the minister/official/dissident who could tell the story best. She was, of course a Ukrainian patriot: but she was clear about keeping her views out of the reportage."

And she did, doing excellent reporting from Russia, initially on the economic chaos that nobody understood, detailing how Western treasury departments and multilateral institutions (notably the International Monetary Fund) were whipping shock therapy on Russia—at the grotesque cost, as The New Yorker's David Remnick put it, of "the destruction of everyday life."

There was an exuberance to Chrystia. Montreal take-no-prisoners freelancer

Sandy Wolofsky recalls our post-Chrétien visit “wheels-up” party in the unforgettable, Canadian-operated Hungry Duck pub, when Freeland was late-night dancing on a tabletop. Still, to quote Lloyd again, she came across as a young “woman of huge intelligence, energy, and good sense.” When John left Moscow at last, Chrystia, still in her twenties, was named bureau chief for the FT.

She had been super-bright as a kid, winning a scholarship out of high school in Edmonton to a world college stint in Italy followed by a scholarship to Harvard where she studied Russian history. But she didn’t surf her way through exams—she did all the work, all the way.

And so she did at the FT, in London, before being hired away to be deputy editor of the Globe and Mail in 1999, then heading back to the FT in London as its Deputy Editor. When a male colleague 20 years older got the top job, Chrystia went to New York as the FT’s U.S./Americas editor and columnist on international finance and business. In 2010, looking for new challenges, she got hired away as Reuters global editor at large, based in New York, and then spearheaded their leap into the new media world as editor of Thomson Reuters Digital. Her rise in journalism had been phenomenal. As a journalist, Chrystia produced top-flight deadline copy that was out there for all to see. As an editor of top-flight operations, she got the best out of talented people and, said Lloyd, was “loyal up and down.”

Along the way, she had married a soft-spoken, fine British writer, Graham Bowley (now with the New York Times, commuting to NYC from Toronto). Together, they have raised three non-passive children. But it would have been impossible without help, especially from her mother, Halyna, who, having done her best on Ukrainian constitution-drafting, moved into the New York household for her grandkids. When she tragically died a decade ago, it was “the Ukrainian ladies” of Nannies International who helped keep it all afloat.

Chrystia somehow found time to write two big books. *Sale of the Century* (2000), about Russia’s rigged privatizations, remains a must-read for those of us who still care about what the hell went wrong with the naive best intentions for Russia’s forward journey from Gorbachev’s heroic acts that changed the world. *Plutocrats* (2012) is a sweeping survey of the landscape of international capitalism, in the wake of its breakdown, which exposed 2008’s financial frauds, and led to the near-collapse of the global system. It is clear from her scathing narrative that Freeland is no neo-liberal.

So, she was super-busy. It wasn't her ambition to get into politics, but as she did tell me over some Chardonnay on a shared flight to Newark a decade ago, she wanted to come back to Canada. But Canadian media space doesn't offer many opportunities to operate at the very top. When the Liberals came calling, having done a big and ambitious book, and with enough-already of New York City, she wondered if public service could be a rewarding Canadian alternative.

Chrystia agonized about running for office. The Liberals were in third place, going nowhere fast. But party politics is actually pretty close to the family bone. Halyna had run in Edmonton Strathcona in 1988—for the NDP! And father Donald Freeland's paternal aunt Beulah was married to long-time Peace River MP Ged Baldwin, who was Progressive Conservative Opposition House Leader for years.

She went for the Liberal nomination to replace Bob Rae in a by-election in Toronto Centre in 2013 and was elected to Parliament. It was around then that Ukraine began to boil. The Conservative Party had been trying under Jason Kenney's organization to break into the Liberals' traditional appeal to immigrant communities. The Canadian-Ukrainian community, more than a million strong, was a prime target.

Ukrainian Canadians, refugees from the Soviet Union's revolution and oppression, especially from the tragic Holodomor, the forced famine of the early 1930s that killed an estimated 3.5 million Ukrainians (and many Russians), are mostly sourced to Galicia, Western Ukraine. It was historically part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, which was more permissive of Ukrainian cultural autonomy and language rights than the Soviet Union, which repressed them. So, there is ample historic anti-Moscow nationalist sentiment in Lviv, which was the capital of Galicia, that still animates Canada's Ukrainian community.

When the Euromaidan protests broke out in 2014 between the wary union of reformist and nationalist Ukrainians and the Moscow-supported regime of Viktor Yanukovich, Stephen Harper, Kenney and the Conservatives chose the side of Ukrainian diaspora votes. Harper wouldn't shake Vladimir Putin's hand at a G20 meeting without (so he boasted to Canadian media) snarling, "Get out of Ukraine."

But the diminished Liberals had one Ukrainian/Canadian parliamentary card to play. They sent Chrystia off to Kiev, where she encouraged the young reformers occupying the Maidan. Speaking the language, being a master communicator, owning an apartment with her sister, Natalka, overlooking the Maidan, she was a

hit, carrying weight precisely because she was an old Moscow hand. The Russians noticed.

After the Liberals won in October, 2015, Chrystia was a shoo-in for a top economic portfolio. She must have been hoping for Finance. Over-reaching? Hardly—read her book. But Bay Street doesn't read books, so she became minister of trade.

There haven't been that many political leaders in Canada who actually had a record of running operations of consequence—Brian Mulroney and Paul Martin stand out. Chrystia stood out in that first Trudeau cabinet for competence and experience, including a sound instinct for knowing whom to connect with and what made them tick.

Her biggest task was to deliver the CETA trade deal with the European Union. As a 21st-century economic partnership treaty that breaks new progressive ground, CETA makes the new NAFTA look almost clunky. It's said that it took seven years to negotiate. Actually, it began in 1972, but that's another story. Jean Chrétien reanimated it, Premier Jean Charest forced the issue with France, and ultimately it fell to the Harper government to open formal negotiations. But it would take Chrystia's leadership to pull off a complex and ground-breaking comprehensive deal through very hard work, superb personal connections with top Europeans, and political persuasion of parliamentary doubters in several capitals.

Cut to November 2016, and the world gets Donald Trump and his vow to tear up NAFTA. It was hard to imagine the all-important NAFTA re-negotiation with the America Firsters under anyone else, and so she replaced Stéphane Dion as foreign minister.

At the top, it was Chrystia Freeland head-to-head against U.S. Trade Representative Bob Lighthizer. They seriously underestimated her (always a plus for a negotiator) and weren't very nice, resenting her exceptional media impact, especially in Washington. Who the hell did she think she was? Only Canada's foreign minister. And she was about as good as any, ever. As John Delacourt writes elsewhere in this issue of Policy, she never negotiated in public but somehow came out with all the good lines, that, bit by bit moved the political dial in our direction.

She was tough and she and her team were tough-minded enough to know Canada could live without a deal if we had to. It showed. In the end, it was Trump who ended up most needing the win. It was Chrystia who could say at the end win-

win-win, and who made Bob Lighthizer dinner in her Toronto kitchen with the kids.

The U.S. deal was the essential national existential defensive save. It was historic. But as foreign affairs minister, she began some other things that are also very important. I thought they would rank her tenure with Joe Clark's and Lloyd Axworthy's as among the very best if she stayed to press these themes across the global board. They have laid the groundwork for her successor, François-Philippe Champagne, to pursue, especially mounting a like-minded rally in support of inclusive democracy and liberal internationalism. In the pro-Russian, anti-Western, pro-nationalism media out there she is caricatured as an adversary, a human rights interventionist.

In reality, her much-publicized stand in favour of Saudi women was not from some longstanding human rights vocation. She had been primarily an international business writer. But in the summer of 2018, the facts were eloquent and dark. University of British Columbia mentors reported that Loujain al-Hathloul, who had done a degree there while becoming committed to gender equity was being tortured back home for advocating women's rights. She wasn't a Canadian citizen but the news distressed Chrystia, and when Samar Badawi, the sister of jailed and flogged blogger Raif Badawi, got arrested a few weeks later, the minister took a critical stand against Saudi behaviour on behalf of Raif Badawi's wife, Ensaf Haidar, who had fled to Canada for asylum.

Freeland believed the sincerity of our values was on the line. She wasn't content just to signal our virtue. She believed we had to help.

A tweet from our Embassy in Riyadh that they should at once release Samar Badawi provoked the Saudi theocracy to a massive over-reaction. Chrystia was then slammed by some pro-business groups for letting do-gooder naïveté put Canadian jobs at risk. She didn't get much international support at first—until Jamal Khashoggi was butchered.

The experience was jarring. It made Chrystia Freeland want to use her ministry for value issues as well as macro-trade deals.

Trump's reversal of U.S. policy on human rights and international cooperation, notably climate change, as well as what he was doing to democracy's reputation were preoccupying other like-minded democratic leaders. Chrystia found herself

building a caucus, an informal alliance with her colleagues in Berlin, Paris, Stockholm and elsewhere. Last year, German Foreign Minister Heiko Maas invited her to address Germany's heads of mission from around the world. Germany awarded her the prestigious Warburg Award—for the first time to a Canadian—for steering Canada's firm commitment to multilateralism and to shared transatlantic values. He praised Chrystia for standing by her convictions. "You are an activist in the best sense of the word—both principled and realistic."

She has tried to apply the rights and democracy value proposition to other relevant international conflict issues where Canada had some standing. But a few outreach efforts fell flat or didn't happen. For example, as minister, she didn't go to Africa. She would have, but had to triage her time. Overall, our relationship with Russia could scarcely be worse. It's partly their fault, obviously. Chrystia Freeland actually did want to connect even though she was on their sanctions list. But when she did meet Putin and Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov at a G20 event, Putin's well-known inner misogynist seems to have reacted badly to this rather small, very bright Russian-speaking minister setting out some ideas that weren't wholly congenial to Putin's souring world view. The relationship flat-lined near zero.

On China, the ruination of relations is not her fault. She wasn't part of the Meng Wanzhou ambush but has loyally defended what happened as respecting the rule of law. The cruel reprisal captivity of the two Michaels sears at her, as it should. China insiders confide that her Beijing counterparts respect her. Still, however the immediate hostage situation plays out, things with China have changed. We'll not be as friendly with Beijing as we once thought we would be, but nor can we be hostage to an emerging epochal duel for global leadership between the world's two biggest economies.

As last year produced government blunders and polls indicating minority government prospects, her own performance in the government stood out. As veteran Liberal strategist Peter Donolo puts it, "Her well-tuned sense of political theatre was a contrast to the slavish attachment to talking points exhibited by most of her cabinet colleagues," who seemingly hadn't been given her latitude. Once the election results were in, it became inevitable that she would be transferred out of foreign affairs because of the Alberta credibility deficit and the evident need of Trudeau to have a strong deputy.

It now makes her a potentially decisive figure across the Canadian landscape. Let's be candid. Her good judgment is going to be calling some big shots in this minority government, in place of big shots in the PMO calling them in the last

one. When the ministerial mandate letters surfaced on December 13, Freeland's described an unprecedented level of deputized executive power. Justin Trudeau ought to be the beneficiary, and good for him for understanding her value. Howard Balloch who was a long-time ambassador to China, comments:

"Chrystia Freeland listens, deeply and intently, to as wide a spectrum of informed views as possible as she formulates her own." In this, she reminds Balloch of previous very successful foreign minister Joe Clark whose "same respect for both facts and the complex prisms that refract perception of those facts when seen from other cultures and backgrounds," also put him in charge of federal-provincial relationships at a vexed time in our history.

Let's hope it works out for Freeland, for Trudeau, and for the country; that the Peace River part of the Alberta girl clicks in enough to win back the public's trust that the government is listening while it leads.

Chrystia Freeland has risen to new heights. Everyone knows she may go higher. It's an impressive story. We should count ourselves lucky that she had a hankering for home.

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## Canada has plenty to gain from upping its defence spending

Colin Robertson,

Globe and Mail, November 27, 2019

If we thought passage of the new North American free-trade agreement would get Donald Trump off our back, think again. We've been served notice that Canada has got to pony up more on defence and security. We should do so, not because the U.S. wants us to, but because it serves Canadian interests, especially in exercising Canadian sovereignty in our North.

The Trump administration is close to a deal with Speaker Nancy Pelosi on congressional ratification of the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) on trade. The possible changes to the agreement signed last November will not trouble Canada. Tougher labour and environmental standards enforcement – "trust but verify" – are aimed at Mexico. Another change would shorten the patent-protection period for new pharmaceutical drugs.

The USMCA could pass through Congress before Christmas. But even if the deal gets stuck, Mr. Trump's threat to rescind NAFTA is increasingly remote. The more

Americans learned about NAFTA, the more they liked it, especially in the farming community and Mr. Trump needs their votes if he is to be re-elected next year.

A new trade agreement does not mean complacency about trade.

We're still paying tariffs on our lumber exports. Protectionism, especially in procurement, is endemic. We need to sustain the Team Canada effort with Congress, governors and state legislators. Rather than blame Ottawa, provincial premiers need to remind their neighbouring states why trade and investment is mutually beneficial. Premiers and governors should strive for a reciprocity agreement on procurement.

But if our trading relationship is shifting out of crisis mode, defence and security will take that space. Continued free riding by the allies, as the Trump administration sees it, is not an option.

With the end of the Cold War, Canada took the peace dividend and then coasted in our defence spending. But today's world is meaner with a rising China and revanchist Russia.

The Trudeau Government thought its defence policy – titled Strong, Secure, Engaged – and its promise of new warships, fighter jets and active missions in Latvia and Iraq, would suffice. Wrong. For Mr. Trump, the bottom line is the 2014 commitment by the governments of North Atlantic Treaty Organization member-countries to achieve spending of 2 per cent of gross domestic product on defence by 2024. Canadian spending, according to NATO, is currently 1.27 per cent. It is scheduled to rise to around 1.4 per cent by 2026-27, well short of the allies' pledge.

If we are going to spend more, then let's invest in northern sovereignty.

Brian Mulroney persuaded Ronald Reagan to tacitly acknowledge Canadian sovereignty through Arctic waters. Since then, the Americans have pressed us to exercise that sovereignty. Stephen Harper instituted Operation Nanook and he made annual summer visits to the North. But the promised Arctic base in Nanisivik, Nunavut, has never materialized. The promised icebreakers are still to be built.

In contrast to the American, Chinese and Russian policies, Canada's long-delayed Arctic policy framework, finally released in September, is sophomoric. It ignores both defence and security.

The Americans want us to collaborate in updating the postwar North Warning System. Jointly managed as part of our NORAD alliance, its replacement will be expensive. But it's also an opportunity for us to lead in the development of innovative space and underwater applications that would buttress our Arctic sovereignty. We can take inspiration from HMCS Harry DeWolf, the first of our offshore patrol ships. The largest Canadian warship built in 50 years, it is now afloat in Halifax harbour.

We are also an Indo-Pacific country. The almost year-old Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) gives us first-mover advantage over the U.S. in places such as Japan. But our Pacific partners expect us to demonstrate greater commitment to their security. This means more navy and air reach. Is our Pacific posture adequate? Does our capability, including our bases, meet the new threat assessments?

Managing the trade relationship with the Trump administration is hard. David McNaughton was the right ambassador for the Trudeau government's first term and its focus on trade. Mr. MacNaughton's outreach strategy needs to become a permanent campaign.

Our next ambassador will need demonstrated security chops in addition to political savvy. Handling defence and security is going to be really hard. But as a friendly ambassador, whose country faces the same challenge, observed at the recent Halifax International Security Forum, we Canadians are going to have to toughen up.

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Priority one: saving the Canadian foreign service  
Dan Livermore

Centre for International Policy Studies, November 28, 2019

The Canadian foreign service is in desperate condition. If the Trudeau government hopes to achieve its foreign policy objectives, its first priority should be a wholesale reform of Global Affairs Canada that focuses on the rejuvenation of the foreign service.

The Prime Minister is pushing the re-set button on Cabinet priorities, with new instructions to the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the other ministers of Global Affairs Canada (GAC) to outline what the government hopes to achieve in its second mandate.

For obvious reasons, the public's attention is mostly on prominent priorities, like relations with the United States or the negotiation of key trade agreements. Below the radar screens, however, are other issues that weigh heavily in how a government discharges its mandate. In the case of foreign policy, one of the critical questions facing the Trudeau government is the delicate condition of Global Affairs Canada, which should be one of the foundations for the government's future success. The media in the United States have suddenly (and somewhat belatedly) discovered the virtues of a professional foreign service. Possibly there will be a spill-over effect here, as commentators ask themselves about the current capabilities of the Canadian equivalent.

GAC served the government well on trade files and consular issues during its first mandate, with strong records of achievement. Still, the consensus within the Department (among knowledgeable workers) and among many outside observers is that GAC as a whole is in desperate shape, requiring precisely the reform overhaul that Trudeau's ministers seemed reluctant to undertake in their first mandate.

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What's wrong with GAC? Let's start with its personnel, headed by a bloated senior management structure, with more than 100 senior executives, with sparse knowledge of foreign policy and limited experience abroad. Twenty years of disastrous human resource management has left GAC with an emaciated cadre of foreign service officers and gaping vacancies in precisely the areas in which GAC should have expertise. For years its training bureau has been starved of funds, unable to prepare the linguistic experts needed for GAC's geographic divisions and embassies abroad, rendering GAC's depth on almost any geographic issue too thin to measure. Don't even ask about promotions or career management, or GAC's new plans for workplace accommodation.

GAC fought off some egregious assaults of the Harper-Baird years, including a fire-sale of historic diplomatic properties and attempts to downgrade heads of mission and shut down traditional lines of policy advice on key issues. After this decade of darkness, a repair effort should have been undertaken immediately after 2015. Instead, work on the integration of Foreign Affairs, and the former CIDA produced an even more opaque, ponderous and paper-heavy Department, in which timeliness, depth of knowledge and effectiveness were low on the list of GAC strengths.

**Recommended: Nationalist Internationalists? The Strange Paradoxes of the Global Right**

Without foreign service recruitment for much of the past decade, its numbers have gone down dramatically, while the number of contractors, students, interns and term employees has shot up. An announced recruitment this year will do little to remedy the longer-term problem, and nothing is seemingly underway to do justice to the hundreds of short-term gap-fillers who have been carrying the load over the past ten years. Little wonder that the attrition rate is rising in a Department that was once considered a fine place to work.

While GAC was entrenching itself in bureaucratic stasis, other Departments with foreign policy responsibilities began to build up impressive international units. These units across government hold much of the expertise on international affairs once nurtured and managed by GAC.

Observers can speculate about the debilities of GAC, but it's no secret to those inside the Department. More to the point, however, the idea of a Canadian foreign service is itself under attack, particularly at the top levels of government, where many don't believe that a "foreign service" is useful nor that GAC should be managed differently than other ministries with domestic responsibilities.

The current leadership of GAC is weak in precisely those areas that were once its strength – knowledge of the world, international relations and foreign policy. It's no wonder that Canada is punching below its weight these days on international issues or that Canada's bid for a UN Security Council seat in 2020 is in serious jeopardy. Possibly only a defeat in that campaign will alert ministers to what they were warned about in 2015 and what they should be moving to correct now.

**The idea of a Canadian foreign service is itself under attack, particularly at the top levels of government**

What would a rejuvenated Department with a fully staffed foreign service do differently? Serious foreign ministries are a combination of policy and communication think-tanks and program implementation offices. GAC's weakness on the policy side began in the Harper years when policy formulation was essentially delegated to political appointees and party hacks. Policy formulation has yet to re-bounce under Trudeau despite the challenges we face from China to Russia to the Middle East because we have yet to regain our once extensive expertise on countries and regions, anchored in time served on the ground.

The top priority in GAC should be getting the policy structure right because Canada can't react wisely to situations like the Huawei challenge or the imprisonment of two Canadian hostages unless it has well-considered, realistic and viable policies in place that speak directly to Canadian interests and values.

On the program implementation side, no rejuvenation of GAC can escape the need to take another swipe at trying to get development assistance delivery right, with an emphasis on timeliness and effectiveness. No one believes that the fusion of DFAIT and CIDA has worked. It's time to look at this issue again. At the same time, GAC has to re-build key instruments of foreign policy that have atrophied over the past decade. At the top of the list should be re-constructing cultural relations and public diplomacy.

**Recommended: What does a new ambassador mean for Canada-China relations?**

Re-building the foundations of Canadian foreign policy is a formidable, long-term challenge. The repair job is tricky because it cannot be left to GAC's current senior leadership, most of whom don't understand the requirements of a Canadian foreign service. However it is done, reform has to be mandated at the political level, and its progress has to be monitored from above.

There's no mystery as to the need for a reform effort. The mysteries are why the decline of the Canadian foreign service was allowed to happen and why it hasn't been addressed more quickly.

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Cyber-Security: The Threats from Russia and the Middle East

Ferry de Kerckhove

CGAI, December 2019

## Introduction

The art of war has changed considerably since the end of the Second World War. In the last 15 years, the centre of gravity has slowly shifted from the Atlantic to the Pacific. The West is increasingly being destabilized. Hybrid warfare and cyber-attacks have become increasingly effective alternatives to both hard and soft power. Russia is a major player in this domain; so is Iran. Other players are joining the fray, most of them hostile to the West, such as Iran and Russia's client states. The barriers between civilian and military are fading quickly. All-out war now happens in a space that's invisible to the naked eye. Not only is such warfare threatening us, but it also has consequences we have barely begun to assess. The divide between good and bad is blurring. Marshall McLuhan said the medium is the message. Today, the medium and the message are an undecipherable continuum where evil and lies coexist with truth and goodwill. Technological prowess increases vulnerability, but technology is also at the heart of corresponding systems of security. Thus, we have fully entered a new arms race where deterrence comes from the other side knowing what you don't want him to discover, but what you want him to fear.

Voltaire said: "If you wish to speak to me, let us start by defining the meaning of our words." In this day and age, this mantra is particularly applicable to the definition of contemporary threats as well as of the targets, or even who is in the sights of Russian and Middle Eastern leaders. "Cyberspace is a domain characterized by the use of electronics and the electromagnetic spectrum to store, modify, and exchange data via networked systems and associated physical infrastructures. In effect, cyberspace can be thought of as the interconnection of human beings through computers and telecommunication, without regard to physical geography."<sup>1</sup> Consequently, "(c)ybersecurity is the practice of protecting systems, networks, and programs from digital attacks. These **cyberattacks** are usually aimed at accessing, changing, or destroying sensitive information; extorting money from users; or interrupting normal business processes. Implementing effective cybersecurity measures is particularly challenging today because there are more devices than people, and attackers are becoming more innovative."<sup>2</sup>

Discussions focus on whether Russia or China is the heavyweight in terms of threat. Some argue that China is more subtle while Russia is more of a rogue. But it is undeniable that China's attempt to change the fundamental paradigm of international relations, while using and hopefully subduing the existing international order's mechanisms to its advantage, represents a holistic approach and is thus more threatening to the world if it even partly succeeds. Indeed, the planet's centre of gravity is moving from the Atlantic to the Pacific and that means the global threat comes from China. If we needed a reminder, in 2014 Chinese hackers stole the personal information of more than 22 million people connected to U.S. security clearance processes.<sup>3</sup> Not bad for five years ago!

## The Russian Threat

Of course, Russia is no slouch as a threat, but despite being a nuclear superpower, it still remains a niche player and President Vladimir Putin is a tactician far more than a strategic thinker. Whenever he sees a void, he attempts to occupy the terrain, as he did after President Donald Trump's withdrawal of U.S. troops from Syria. But that does not make Putin less nefarious. One could argue that, to a considerable extent, the West has forced him into that position. From 1992 until Putin's accession to power in 2000 – reminiscent of Dean Acheson's "present at the creation" of a "new old" country – it was humiliating for a proud, albeit misdirected country for 70 years, to be dictated to with little consideration. The sight of Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin melting down into a buffoon was a disgrace. Indeed, despite François Mitterrand's 1995 warning "never to humiliate Russia",<sup>4</sup> the West did exactly that. It took advantage of the diminished Yeltsin, tried to fast-track the transformation of Russia from Soviet socialism into a "wild, wild East" capitalism<sup>5</sup> even before property laws had been clearly defined, and brought NATO closer to Russia's borders by incorporating some of the former Soviet republics into the fold. Putin considers the latter a betrayal of past agreements and an existential threat. Or probably more accurately, he sees it as an impediment to his vision of Russia at the heart of Eurasia, his ill-defined, Soviet-inspired, geostrategic zone of influence with Russia's re-emergence "as the central actor in Eurasia ... as a distinct political and security space."<sup>6</sup> This led to the Crimea takeover and further encroachments in Ukraine, as well as eventually, a dominant role in Syria's future. More recently, Putin has been playing chess master between Turkey and Iran.

As Putin stated: "Unfortunately, our Western partners, having divided the USSR's geopolitical legacy, were certain of their own incontestable righteousness having declared themselves the victors of the 'Cold War'."<sup>7</sup> To Putin, ideology matters little; territory does. This explains why, feeling it has been robbed of its history, space and legacy, "Moscow harbours a strong sense of strategic entitlement and will assert its 'rights' energetically."<sup>8</sup> While the West confidently felt that Russia would see the advantage of globalization, which it was prepared to "teach" to the new student, the actual result was an explosion of nationalism in the face of an alien culture.<sup>9</sup> It is noteworthy that Putin considers the fall of the Soviet Union a catastrophe.

Then came Crimea. Again, there are two perspectives on the takeover. On the one hand, there is the outcome of the fall of the Soviet Union and the hasty march toward independence of the former republics, with existing borders defining the new states. On the latter point, the 1994 Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances (not "guarantees"), although considered an important landmark, had a single purpose: to convince Ukraine to abandon its nuclear weapons in exchange for a commitment by the signatories to provide it with support: "1. The United States of America, the Russian Federation, and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, reaffirm their commitment to Ukraine, in accordance with the principles of the CSCE [Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe] Final Act, *to respect the Independence and Sovereignty and the existing borders of Ukraine.*"<sup>10</sup> The memorandum, although formally signed, is not a treaty. Indeed, "Although signatories 'reaffirm their commitment' to Ukraine in many passages, the memorandum requires them to do almost nothing concrete, in the event that Ukraine's sovereignty – territorial or political – is violated. There aren't any hard enforcement mechanisms."<sup>11</sup> Ukraine is the subject of the memorandum, rather than a full participant. Furthermore, according

to Volodymyr Vasylenko, Ukraine's former representative at NATO, who took part in drawing up the conceptual principles and specific provisions of the Budapest memorandum, "the form and content of the Memorandum ... show that, unfortunately, the Budapest talks on giving Ukraine security guarantees did not eventually result in a comprehensive international agreement that creates an adequate special international mechanism to protect our national security."<sup>12</sup>

On the other hand, there is Russia's historical origin. Kiev is older than Moscow and it was the awkward "gift" that Nikita Khrushchev made when he gave Crimea to Ukraine in recognition of the role the Ukrainian communist party played in building his career. Putin the nationalist considered it an aberration, particularly given the location of the Russian fleet in Sebastopol. So, he decided in 2014 to retake it illegally in a bloodless action, knowing full well that neither Ukraine nor the international community would ever have authorized an independent referendum. In fact, Russia goes so far as to suggest that the Budapest memorandum does not apply "if conduct contrary to it occurs because of 'domestic, political or socio-economic factors'."<sup>13</sup>

But the real and continuing threat that Russia poses is the ongoing battle by the un-uniformed "green men" whom Moscow dispatched to Ukraine's eastern border. That threat is underscored by the 10,000+ Ukrainian victims, accompanied by the unending intimidation of some of the former Soviet republics, notably those in the Baltics that had embraced the protection of NATO. The Russian trolls operating against NATO troops in these states are clear evidence of Russia's definitive attempts to destabilize the West and scare these former republics. The post-Soviet republics, in the so-called near-abroad, remain the ongoing focus of Moscow which, for example, assuaged Georgia while engulfing Abkhazia and South Ossetia into its direct control. Furthermore, Russia has re-established a strong presence in the "stans" of Central Asia.

Yet, other than as a nuclear power with an associated outsized effect on international affairs, Russia is a relatively weak country, with low fertility rates, an oil-dependent economy,<sup>14</sup> and limited industrialization for its level of education and military technology. One of the reasons for the latter is the inability of a still secretive country to ensure that militarily developed technologies benefit the private industrial sector. The U.S. is exactly the opposite, which evoked earlier condemnations of the military-industrial complex by the likes of Canadian-born John Kenneth Galbraith, but this is at the heart of its economic prowess. The mutual denunciation by the U.S. and Russia of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty has added to the security uncertainty because Russia has accelerated the development – with recent casualties – of a hypersonic cruise missile, and Trump has declared the U.S. to be well advanced in its own development. It seems that the nature and purpose of U.S. research in the field is different but effective.<sup>15</sup>

Despite Trump's denials, the Mueller report and Clint Watts' testimony on Russia's interference with U.S. elections<sup>16</sup> have amply demonstrated the Russian capacity to wage an all-out disinformation war against the West in order, as a recent Macdonald-Laurier Institute conference illustrated, to break "the political, economic, and military framework of European and North Atlantic cooperation".<sup>17</sup> This was the first attack on the U.S. against which it did not defend itself.

The Macdonald-Laurier Institute sets out Russian behaviour in clear terms: “Russia uses hybrid or asymmetric tactics to advance its goals in Eastern Europe and beyond. Hybrid warfare combines the use of conventional warfare, covert or irregular warfare, cyber attacks, political disinformation, propaganda campaigns, psychological operations and other tactics. It is meant to keep adversaries off balance through information disruption which generates confusion.”

An important element is the use of disinformation and offensive cyber-activities. Russian websites have already tried to spread vicious rumours about NATO troops in the Baltics. Closer to home, they have spread rumours about the family history of Canada’s former Foreign Affairs minister, Chrystia Freeland, and have worked to manipulate aspects of Baltic history in an effort to marginalize their security concerns.

Russia has a wide range of cyber-tools and resources, including the ability to carry out denial-of-service attacks, develop sophisticated malware and exploit previously unknown software vulnerabilities. Kremlin cyber-warriors are capable of targeting everything from individual mobile phones to the IT infrastructures of entire governments. The Baltic countries have been exposed to these types of threats for some time and are familiar with the danger.<sup>18</sup> A very eloquent description of Russian capabilities can be found in a testimony given by Jakub Kalensky, senior fellow at the Atlantic Council.<sup>19</sup>

On Nov. 3, during his Global Public Square program on CNN, Fareed Zakaria cited a Facebook investigation which showed a massive Russian operation aimed at 250,000 followers on 50 Instagram profiles, with a doubling down on its cyber-capability. According to the U.S.’s National Security Agency and to U.K. intelligence, Russia has even managed to piggyback on an Iranian cyber-operation to reach 35 countries to deliver messages purporting to be from Iran. We are talking here of an all-out information war – Trump’s denials notwithstanding – against the West, its democracies, its institutions and its values, with the hope of wreaking havoc in co-operative frameworks such as NATO and the EU. France experienced cyber-attacks during its last presidential and parliamentary elections. So did Germany. Canada seems not to be immune, either. The U.K. is in the midst of a crisis regarding a secret report on Russian infiltration. Unfortunately, Trump’s unending attacks on U.S. allies within NATO and the EU, and his attacks against the institutions themselves, are dangerously facilitating Russia’s destabilizing activities. It is all the more disheartening that, apparently, the president’s border wall project is actually shifting funds away from construction projects in Europe designed to help these allies prevent a possible Russian attack.

Yet, the December 2017 U.S. National Security Strategy – a document Trump signed – states very clearly: “Russia uses information operations as part of its offensive cyber efforts to influence public opinion across the globe. Its influence campaigns blend covert intelligence operations and false online personas with state-funded media, third-party intermediaries, and paid social media users or ‘trolls’.”<sup>20</sup> It goes further: “U.S. efforts to counter the exploitation of information by rivals have been tepid and fragmented. U.S. efforts have lacked a sustained focus and have been hampered by the lack of properly trained professionals.”<sup>21</sup> The strategy underscores that Russia and China are

“determined to make economies less free and less fair, to grow their militaries, and to control information and data to repress their societies and expand their influence”. The size of the threat from a defence perspective is equally clear: “Virtually all modern weapon systems depend upon data derived from scientific and technical intelligence.”<sup>22</sup> This is not to say that the U.S. and other Western nations can’t counter the threat or engage in similar activities. In an extraordinary report, “How the U.S. Hacked ISIS”,<sup>23</sup> one can discover how Operation Glowing Symphony succeeded in building “a team and an operation that would deny, degrade and disrupt ISIS’s media operation”. Ironically, the U.S.’s failed 1979 attempt to rescue the hostages at the U.S. embassy in Iran led to a major buildup of special operations forces. The U.S.’s intelligence capabilities nowadays reflect the view of those engaged in counter-cyber-warfare that “it is critical the military is poised to identify what the future holds when we face peer and near peer adversaries with comparable technologies outside the boundaries of conventional warfare ... The enemy will not fight us conventionally, they’ve told us as much.”<sup>24 25</sup>

### The Middle East

One must look at the Middle East as a quagmire where every country plays a conflicting role, which adds an incentive to bring cyber-capability into the fields of war. The field is also infested with individuals or groups outside of governmental institutions who have interests and power across regimes and polities, and major stakes in outcomes. Iran is the most sophisticated actor, on par with its arch-enemy Israel, the latter still having a huge technological advantage in addition to nuclear weapons. Recent events paint a picture of a much more sophisticated information/disinformation operation on Iran’s part, verging on Machiavellianism.<sup>26</sup>

Iran’s history is complex. The present era started with the 1979 Khomeini/populist/Shia/anti-Wahhabi Sunni/revolution-spawning Hezbollah supporting Syria’s Alaouite (aligned with Shia) Hafez al Assad, father of Bashar. This led to the bloody Sunni Iraq/Shia Iran 1980-1988 war with U.S. military aid going to Iraq. This in turn reinforced Iran’s hatred for the U.S and its support of Saddam Hussein, feelings already well fed by memories of the U.S.-U.K. overthrow of Iran’s nationalist PM Mohammad Mossadegh in the 1950s. Today, Khomeini’s successor, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, has that hatred in his DNA. So do his key partners such as Mohsen Rezaei Mirghaied from the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, former foreign minister Ali Akbar Velayati, secretary of the **Supreme National Security Council** of **Iran** Ali Shamkhani, and a few others. Thus, to the extent that the Iran nuclear deal, the JCPOA – Joint Common Program of Action – had not been enshrined in legislation by the U.S., Trump’s decision to disown it did not come as much of a surprise to the Iranians, although for economic reasons, they wanted it to stick – and they still want it to survive.

Indeed, while its leaders are motivated by strong feelings against the U.S., Iran is remarkably rational from a policy perspective and is guided by its ability or lack thereof to maintain deterrence against its foes. The JCPOA represented a palatable range of concessions by the regime in exchange for the end of sanctions, the end of foreign military threats and a broad interest on the part of the international community to accept Iran’s reintegration in the global commons. Today, the U.S. has no interest, as

the key player, in resuming negotiations, ending threats of military action and providing sanctions relief, while the Europeans appear incapable of finding a modality to resume trade with Iran outside of the dollar-dominated international market. Trump looks at the 1979-1980 hostage crisis and does not want to suffer a defeat à la Jimmy Carter, which brought Ronald Reagan into the White House. Therefore, Trump is not interested in any reconfiguration until after the U.S. 2020 election. If he is re-elected, all options return to the table. Underpinning all this is the nuclear “holy grail”.

While the country is an Islamic state and religion underpins the regime’s solidity, Iran is increasingly guided by its national interest, which can be summarized by a) independence as much from the U.S. as from Russia or China, so it always has options without being tied down one way or another; b) regime preservation; c) managing the transition to a post Khomeini/Khamenei generation; which means d) an emphasis on the economy, however difficult and painful under the present circumstances, while e) avoiding being dragged into an open war. Thus, in the recent spat around the Strait of Hormuz, Iran, in conducting or shepherding the attack on the Saudi ships, signalled its ability to wreak havoc in the region while ensuring a minimum loss of lives. As to its relationship with Israel, Iran profoundly despises Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. By underscoring the weakness of the Arab monarchies, Iran is telling Netanyahu’s successor that it might be more useful to develop relations with Iran – as the shah did – than to cavort with the Arabs. It should be appreciated that Iran’s support of the Palestinian cause has much more to do with embarrassing the Arab nations for not putting pressure on Israel than with any Iranian love for the Palestinians. That support provides them comfort with stooges in the region like Hamas and Hezbollah. Were Israel to actually provide a working state for Palestine, Iran would find an alternative plank to discredit the Arab states.

To operationalize this complex set of relationships, Iran often resorts to cyber-attacks and related stealth instruments. Security agencies estimate that Iran is the main producer of disinformation messages and trolls through local accounts, mainly focusing on Israel, settlements in Palestine, and fake, racially tainted stories. It has become a major power in this regard as well as a prime target of counter-offensives. Indeed, as the *New York Times* reported, the U.S. and Israel jointly developed the now-famous Stuxnet worm: “From his first months in office, President Obama secretly ordered increasingly sophisticated attacks on the computer systems that run Iran’s main nuclear enrichment facilities, significantly expanding America’s first sustained use of cyberweapons.”<sup>27</sup>

*Foreign Affairs*<sup>28</sup> recently published a report on the threat Iran represents as a range of experts perceive it. Responses varied. Some were very ideologically driven, even for scholars. A number of the views underscore that, for the U.S., Iran could not be a major threat but that it has a variety of tools to harm U.S. interests, including through asymmetrical warfare. Others were more concerned about the U.S. mismanaging interests and partners in the region. Most recognized that Iran would avoid any form of large-scale warfare. All underlined Iran’s ability to mobilize “a range of coercive activities: supporting terrorist groups and proxies, utilizing cyber tools, engaging in hostile maritime activities, developing ballistic missile capabilities, and exploiting

psychological and information operations,” as Melissa Dalton of CSIS wrote. Dina Esfandiary reminded readers that “Iran has shown that it can work with the US in arenas like Iraq and Afghanistan when their interests align.” Jeffrey Feltman pointed to Iranian proxies in Lebanon and Yemen affecting U.S. interests and allies in the region, but few writers commented on the excessive damage that the U.S.’s premier ally, Saudi Arabia, did in Yemen.

Feltman also referred to “the potential for U.S. allies in the region to harm our interests, through reckless foreign policy adventurism and discriminatory internal policies.” Mara Karlin expressed serious concerns about the danger of “weak and irresponsible governance across the region” posing a larger threat to the U.S. Elizabeth Rosenberg aptly said that “a demonization of Iran in U.S. foreign policy should not obscure a U.S. focus on other concerns in the region.” There was a strong undercurrent of criticism of the U.S. administration’s unilateralist approach to Iran. The RAND Corporation’s Ariane Tabatabai expressed this in clear terms: “An array of issues challenge and threaten U.S. interests in the region, including fragile and failed states, the lack of resources and opportunities fueling migration, the refugee influx, the terrorism problem, climate change, and growing near-peer interest and influence in the region. Iran exacerbates these challenges in some areas but our myopic focus on Iran doesn’t do much to advance our long-term interests in the region.”

It is interesting to note that most commentators referred to a range of Iranian capabilities, but cyber wasn’t at the top of the list. Support for groups like Hamas or Hezbollah and the growing presence of Iran in Iraq seem to be seen as more ominous. An interesting twist to the recent spat around the Strait of Hormuz is the U.S.’s September cyber-strikes on “Tehran’s ability to spread ‘propaganda’... in that such “cyber strikes are seen as a less-provocative option below the threshold of war.”<sup>29</sup> Isn’t it nice to know that cyber-attacks are a firewall for worse?

The threat to Canada from Iran is somewhat insignificant given the infinitesimal level of relations between the two countries ever since the Harper government adopted the 2012 *Justice for Victims of Terrorism Act*, which allows victims of terrorism to sue countries that are listed as supporters of terrorism. But there is no question that Iran does not harbour good feelings toward us. For years, we have promoted the harshest possible resolutions at the UN condemning Iran’s human rights abuses. There is little doubt that Iran would use any opportunity to infiltrate Canada. The only positive aspect from Iran’s perspective is that we are sticking with the JCPOA.

### The Implications

While it is important to assess the respective threats of foes such as Russia, Iran or China, it is equally critical to understand where the art of war is going in this day and age of major advances in artificial intelligence and quantum physics. An ominous fact, according to experts, is that: “Conventional wisdom has long held that advances in information technology would inevitably advantage ‘finders’ at the expense of ‘hidiers.’ But that view seems to have been based more on wishful thinking than technical assessment. The immense potential of AI for those who want to thwart would-be ‘finders’ could offset if not exceed its utility for enabling them. Finders, in turn, will have to contend with both understanding reality and recognizing what is fake, in a world

where faking is much easier.”<sup>30</sup> In other words, “Stealth technology is living on borrowed time ... once quantum sensors are fielded, there will be nowhere to hide.”<sup>31</sup> There is indeed a dark side to this new arsenal in that cyber-attacks by the “good guys” are normalized. It took a long time for the Obama administration to admit to it. But in its military authorization bill last year, Congress allowed the Defense secretary to authorize some cyber-attacks without referring to the White House. Voices in the U.S. are questioning the legality of such attacks.<sup>32</sup> Ron Deibert, director of the Citizen Lab at the University of Toronto’s Munk School of Global Affairs, has expressed serious concerns about Saudi Arabia’s use of cyber-tools in the murder of journalist Jamal Khashoggi.<sup>33</sup> Escalation is unavoidable in this expanding new domain of war. Given its fundamental stealth nature, control measures such as those enshrined in the consensus report of the United Nations Group of Government Experts (UNGGE) on “Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security”, adopted in July 2015, may look promising in UN legal parlance but are unlikely to make much difference on the invisible ground of cyber-space.<sup>34</sup> There is little deterrence in cyber to the extent that parties cannot wait to be attacked to prepare for a counterattack. Four-star Gen. Paul Nakasone, director of U.S. Cyber Command, put it squarely: “As we think about cyberspace, we should agree on a few foundational concepts. First, our nation is in constant contact with its adversaries; we’re not waiting for adversaries to come to us. Our adversaries understand this, and they are always working to improve that contact. Second, our security is challenged in cyberspace. We have to actively defend; we have to conduct reconnaissance; we have to understand where our adversary is and his capabilities; and we have to understand their intent. Third, superiority in cyberspace is temporary; we may achieve it for a period of time, but it’s ephemeral. That’s why we must operate continuously to seize and maintain the initiative in the face of persistent threats. Why do the threats persist in cyberspace? They persist because the barriers to entry are low and the capabilities are rapidly available and can be easily repurposed. Fourth, in this domain, the advantage favors those who have initiative.”<sup>35</sup>

But there is one fundamental conclusion: Countries like Canada and the United States are the countries “most highly dependent on (today’s) technologies,” Deibert said, “and arguably the most vulnerable to these sorts of attacks.”

Isn’t there a saying about the best defence being a good offence? We need to give this some serious thought.

### *End Notes*

<sup>1</sup> “Cyberspace,” What is.com . Available at <https://whatis.techtarget.com/definition/cyberspace>

<sup>2</sup> “What is Cyber Security?” CISCO. Available at <https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/products/security/what-is-cybersecurity.html>

<sup>3</sup> Eric Rosenbach and Katherine Mansted, “How to Win the Battle over Data,” *Foreign Affairs*, Sept. 17, 2019. Available

at <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2019-09-17/how-win-battle-over-data>

**4** On the occasion of the 50<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the end of the Second World War in Moscow in 1995.

**5** As coined for the author in 1993 by a senior advisor of then-president Boris Yeltsin.

**6** “Russia and Eurasia,” Report, Stockholm International Peace Institute. Available at <https://www.sipri.org/research/conflict-and-peace/russia-and-eurasia>

**7** Tom O’Connor, “Russia’s Putin Reveals His Biggest Mistake: Trusting the West,” *Newsweek*, Oct. 19, 2017. Available at <https://www.newsweek.com/russia-putin-reveal-biggest-mistake-trusting-west-688998>

**8** Bobo Lo, “Russia’s Crisis: What It Means for Regime Stability and Moscow’s Relations with the World,” Policy Brief, Centre for European Reform. Available at [https://www.cer.eu/sites/default/files/publications/attachments/pdf/2011/policybrief\\_russia\\_19feb09-771.pdf](https://www.cer.eu/sites/default/files/publications/attachments/pdf/2011/policybrief_russia_19feb09-771.pdf) I have used this quotation and the following one in a previous article on Russia. I also use some of my previous text.

**9** See Eduard Ponarin, “The Effect of Globalization on Russia,” in “**Conflict and Reconstruction in Multiethnic Societies: Proceedings of a Russian-American Workshop**,” National Academies and the Russian Academy of Sciences, 2001. Available at <https://www.nap.edu/read/1>

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Ukraine's role in impeachment inquiry indicative of bigger problem for U.S.

The real damage from the ongoing impeachment narrative is the harm being done to American prestige and credibility in world affairs

Derek H. Burney

National Post, November 27, 2019

Barring any sudden shift in public opinion, the impeachment hearings in Washington will not lead to impeachment. The outcome will be determined by partisan votes and have little to do with facts or the voluminous testimony from officials. The majority Democrats in the House will vote for impeachment while the majority Republicans in the Senate will block any conviction. Thus far there has been no appreciable change in public opinion and the ultimate verdict on Donald Trump will more likely be delivered by the electorate next November. But the repercussions from the events triggering this issue extend well beyond America and directly impact American global interests.

The crux of the impeachment deliberations is whether the president’s actions to curtail military aid unless Ukraine’s president agreed to open investigations into 2016 election conspiracy theories and, more significantly, into actions by former vice-president Joe Biden and his son Hunter in Ukraine constituted “high crimes and misdemeanors.” Democrats are adamant that they do. Republicans defend the president suggesting that, while his telephone exchange with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky may not

have been appropriate, the aid was eventually delivered and no investigations were initiated.

The tawdry, back channel actions by Rudy Giuliani and others, including two of his cohorts now under arrest in New York for campaign finance violations, are dubious on many grounds. They cajoled Ukrainian authorities to launch investigations and stimulated the abrupt dismissal of the former U.S. ambassador to Ukraine, Marie Yovanovitch. When Deputy Secretary of State John Sullivan was asked whether Giuliani had been behind Yovanovitch's ousting, he boldly admitted that Giuliani was "seeking to smear Yovanovitch and have her removed." Sullivan's boss, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, skirted any direct comment about individual State department officials but coyly praised the "outstanding work" of his department.

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The antics of Giuliani and his allies not only besmirched the character of career officers and frustrated their efforts to implement conventional U.S. policy in Ukraine but they also distracted the policy focus in Ukraine undermining what are explicit U.S. national security interests.

Another back channel of sorts, the acting Chief of Staff Mick Mulvaney, who serves concurrently as director of the Office of Management and Budget, ordered a halt to the aid almost certainly with the knowledge if not at the direction of the president. He also reportedly ordered the aid to flow once the rumours triggered a Congressional investigation.

Gordon Sondland, the U.S. ambassador to the EU is a political appointee who contributed \$1.33 million to the president's inauguration. He was also involved in Ukraine and in fact baldly asserted to the House Intelligence Committee that "We all followed the president's order... Everyone was in the loop." The only mystery is why was America's EU ambassador part of that loop?

Career State Department officers were at pains to explain at the impeachment hearings that the U.S.' use of back channels to circumvent embassies and the State Department is not unusual when it is intended to advance U.S. interests or policies. They contended that it is entirely different when backchannels are used to subvert American foreign policy to domestic political objectives. These officials were trying to do their job by implementing conventional U.S. policy in Ukraine — notably by encouraging the youthful new president's government to quash chronic corruption and helping him thwart Russian attempts to disrupt events in Ukraine.

The impeachment process now moves to the House Judiciary Committee where formal articles of impeachment will be recommended for a full vote by the House. It will then

move to a trial in the Senate with the chief justice presiding. The majority Republicans reportedly favour a quick trial primarily to reduce the damage.

Being sandwiched between Germany and the former Soviet Union, Ukrainians have suffered a litany of abuse. In the last century they were victims of invasion, subjugation, starvation and mass executions by their neighbours. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Ukraine traded away its nuclear arsenal, joined the Non-Proliferation Treaty and concluded an agreement with Russia, the U.S. and the United Kingdom. that was meant to provide security guarantees and safeguard their internal borders. It has done neither. Russia violated that agreement in 2014 by annexing Crimea and continues to abuse the terms of the agreement with its ongoing assault into eastern Ukraine.

The U.S. is Ukraine's only strategic ally. The Europeans have little stomach for a direct conflict with Russia and President Vladimir Putin knows that. Even though Trump has delivered more lethal aid to Ukraine than his predecessor, the new Ukrainian government had good reason to be wary of Trump's reliability. In the 2016 election campaign Trump stated that Crimea was "probably Russian anyway, so why the fuss?" His oddly acquiescent approach to Putin remains an enigma for most of America's allies.

While Ukraine is in the crosshairs of the impeachment dispute the real damage from the ongoing narrative is the harm being done to American prestige and credibility in world affairs

Without credible and consistent support from America, Ukraine has even less leverage trying to "get together with President Putin to resolve its problem," as Trump glibly suggested when he met the Ukrainian leader in New York in September. The fact that Zelensky stood firm in the face of heavy intimidation and straddled the dispute erupting in Washington speaks volumes for his personal integrity and strength of character.

While Ukraine is in the crosshairs of the impeachment dispute the real damage from the ongoing narrative is the harm being done to American prestige and credibility in world affairs. Neither China nor Russia speaks or acts as incoherently on global affairs as Trump's America. The U.S. is no longer the ally it once was. Many putative allies of the U.S. cringe at what they observe in Washington and try to stay below the radar in the wistful hope that "This too will pass."

As David Ignatius wrote recently in the Washington Post: "What's outrageous about the Ukraine story isn't that it is a unique example of Trump's fecklessness in foreign policy but that it's so typical. In dealing with Ukraine Trump has behaved the same erratic, unreliable way he has with Syrian Kurds, the South Koreans and America's NATO partners in Europe." Ignatius added that, as Ukrainians struggled daily under shellfire "Trump appeared to treat military aid appropriated by Congress as a personal political tool."

That is why the saddest by product of the impeachment hearings is a lonely and more vulnerable Ukraine up against an emboldened Russia. The only one smiling at the

disarray in Washington is Putin who sees the erratic policy emanations as opportunities to exploit.

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## Why Canada shouldn't agree to swap Meng Wanzhou for the two Canadian prisoners in China

Hugh Stephens

Financial Post, December 11, 2019

Opinion: Canada should use every possible avenue to press for the release of the two Michaels, except giving in to blackmail and paying ransom

Former deputy prime minister John Manley reportedly favours a “prisoner exchange” between Canada and China in order to resolve the ongoing dispute over the detention of Huawei CFO Meng Wanzhou, who is currently free on bail in Vancouver while the B.C. Supreme Court reviews a U.S. demand for her extradition to the United States on bank fraud charges. According to Manley, Canada should “swap” Meng for the release of Michael Kovrig and Michael Spavor, two Canadians held in prison in China on national security charges. They were arrested just days after Canadian officials, acting on a U.S. Department of Justice arrest warrant, detained Meng as she transited Vancouver International Airport on her way to Mexico. They are in effect being held hostage as part of Beijing’s pressure tactics to ensure Meng’s release.

Manley invokes exchanges of spies between the U.S. and the Soviet Union as a precedent. His proposal may be well-intentioned but it has provoked strong reaction from many in Canada, and it should. It amounts to paying ransom for the arrested Canadians and, as with any ransom, opens the door to more such blackmail in future. It also raises questions related to the legal process currently underway in Canada.

A number of issues relating to Meng’s arrest are legitimate cause for concern, but they do not justify simply suspending legitimate legal proceedings and sending her back as part of a so-called prisoner exchange. There are certainly grounds to question whether the U.S. allegations of bank fraud meet the extradition test. The charges are directly related to alleged violations of U.S. sanctions against Iran. Canada is not a party to those sanctions, which raises the obvious question whether the offence Meng is charged with is an offence under Canadian law. But that question, along with others, such as whether her legal rights were abused during her interview and arrest, will be decided in the B.C. Supreme Court.

Given the complexity of the issues under review, all this will take time. But it was not unreasonable for Canadian officials to have concluded it was neither their place nor role to pass judgment on the U.S. warrant at the time it was presented. Manley has suggested Canadian officials could have resorted to “creative incompetence” and allowed Meng to slip through their grasp in Vancouver. That does a disservice to our officials and to the

well-established process governing extradition between our two countries. For Canada to play fast and loose with a U.S. request that, on its face at least, checked all the boxes for legitimacy would undermine long-standing legal arrangements that benefit both countries.

Such a proposed “prisoner swap” would set a precedent Canada would end up regretting, sending an unmistakable signal that Canadians are fair game for hostage-taking whenever a citizen or the interests of a foreign power like China face court proceedings here. It would also undermine the existing extradition process with the United States and come at a political price in terms of Canada’s relations with Washington.

Manley may well be right to worry that Meng’s liberation could happen while the two Michaels remain incarcerated. But the Chinese have repeatedly said (even while denying there is any direct linkage between the Canadians’ arrests and Meng’s detention) that the problems in Canada-China relations will disappear if Canada “reflects on its mistakes” and releases Meng. China won’t make the distinction between a court-ordered release and one imposed by the government but any rule of law country will understand the principles at stake.

What if it the court upholds extradition? Meng presumably would appeal and this will drag out the process. In the meantime, the Canadian hostages will be languishing in jail. There’s no doubt a deal is tempting. An exchange would get them out early, which would bring great relief to their loved ones, and have the additional benefit for the business community (of which Manley is a leading member) of helping restore normal Canada-China commercial relations.

But this all comes back to first principles. Should Canada do a deal with China and resort to a “prisoner exchange?” The answer has to be no. Are there other ways to advocate for the Canadian hostages? Yes, although the results may not be as immediate. International pressure on China to stop using hostage-taking as a retaliatory measure is important.

However seductive it may be to make the current Canada-China standoff disappear by waving the magic wand of a “deal,” we are bound by our values, treaty obligations and long-term interests not to resort to tactics of this nature. Canada should continue to press hard for the release of the two Michaels, using every possible avenue except giving in to blackmail and paying ransom.

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## Why Canada shouldn't agree to swap Meng Wanzhou for the two Canadian prisoners in China

Opinion: Canada should use every possible avenue to press for the release of the two Michaels, except giving in to blackmail and paying ransom

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Financial Post, December 11, 2019

Former deputy prime minister John Manley reportedly favours a “prisoner exchange” between Canada and China in order to resolve the ongoing dispute over the detention of Huawei CFO Meng Wanzhou, who is currently free on bail in Vancouver while the B.C. Supreme Court reviews a U.S. demand for her extradition to the United States on bank fraud charges. According to Manley, Canada should “swap” Meng for the release of Michael Kovrig and Michael Spavor, two Canadians held in prison in China on national security charges. They were arrested just days after Canadian officials, acting on a U.S. Department of Justice arrest warrant, detained Meng as she transited Vancouver International Airport on her way to Mexico. They are in effect being held hostage as part of Beijing’s pressure tactics to ensure Meng’s release.

Manley invokes exchanges of spies between the U.S. and the Soviet Union as a precedent. His proposal may be well-intentioned but it has provoked strong reaction from many in Canada, and it should. It amounts to paying ransom for the arrested Canadians and, as with any ransom, opens the door to more such blackmail in future. It also raises questions related to the legal process currently underway in Canada.

A number of issues relating to Meng’s arrest are legitimate cause for concern, but they do not justify simply suspending legitimate legal proceedings and sending her back as part of a so-called prisoner exchange. There are certainly grounds to question whether the U.S. allegations of bank fraud meet the extradition test. The charges are directly related to alleged violations of U.S. sanctions against Iran. Canada is not a party to those sanctions, which raises the obvious question whether the offence Meng is charged with is an offence under Canadian law. But that question, along with others, such as whether her legal rights were abused during her interview and arrest, will be decided in the B.C. Supreme Court.

Given the complexity of the issues under review, all this will take time. But it was not unreasonable for Canadian officials to have concluded it was neither their place nor role to pass judgment on the U.S. warrant at the time it was presented. Manley has suggested Canadian officials could have resorted to “creative incompetence” and allowed Meng to slip through their grasp in Vancouver. That does a disservice to our officials and to the well-established process governing extradition between our two countries. For Canada to play fast and loose with a U.S. request that, on its face at least, checked all the boxes for legitimacy would undermine long-standing legal arrangements that benefit both countries.

Such a proposed “prisoner swap” would set a precedent Canada would end up regretting, sending an unmistakable signal that Canadians are fair game for hostage-taking whenever a citizen or the interests of a foreign power like China face court proceedings here. It would also undermine the existing extradition process with the

United States and come at a political price in terms of Canada's relations with Washington.

Manley may well be right to worry that Meng's liberation could happen while the two Michaels remain incarcerated. But the Chinese have repeatedly said (even while denying there is any direct linkage between the Canadians' arrests and Meng's detention) that the problems in Canada-China relations will disappear if Canada "reflects on its mistakes" and releases Meng. China won't make the distinction between a court-ordered release and one imposed by the government but any rule of law country will understand the principles at stake.

What if it the court upholds extradition? Meng presumably would appeal and this will drag out the process. In the meantime, the Canadian hostages will be languishing in jail. There's no doubt a deal is tempting. An exchange would get them out early, which would bring great relief to their loved ones, and have the additional benefit for the business community (of which Manley is a leading member) of helping restore normal Canada-China commercial relations.

But this all comes back to first principles. Should Canada do a deal with China and resort to a "prisoner exchange?" The answer has to be no. Are there other ways to advocate for the Canadian hostages? Yes, although the results may not be as immediate. International pressure on China to stop using hostage-taking as a retaliatory measure is important.

However seductive it may be to make the current Canada-China standoff disappear by waving the magic wand of a "deal," we are bound by our values, treaty obligations and long-term interests not to resort to tactics of this nature. Canada should continue to press hard for the release of the two Michaels, using every possible avenue except giving in to blackmail and paying ransom.

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If we can put partisan politics aside, we might find a smart China policy

Colin Robertson

Globe and Mail, December 23, 2019

With the appointment of the all-party parliamentary committee, our China relationship may get the attention it deserves. Our security and economic well-being depend on an astute understanding of the wider world and, after the U.S., that means China.

The committee's effectiveness depends on its members: Can the Tories resist demonizing China? Can the Liberals get over their opposition to the committee – welcome to minority government – and avoid wishful thinking on China?

The committee should look at three broad baskets: trade and investment; people connections including human rights; security and defence. It also needs to ask: Is our quiet diplomacy working? The committee hearings will inform a public increasingly feeling chilly on China.

China is our second largest trading partner. When Hong Kong is included, China constitutes our sixth largest source of foreign investment. Chinese-made products are integral to our digital lives. China is a primary market for our farmers. As Wendy Dobson argues in Living with China, we need a forward-looking policy acknowledging China's state capitalism and the challenges around intellectual property and state-owned enterprises. We cannot do it ourselves, so we must work with our Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development partners in pressing for Chinese adherence to standards such as those in our new Trans-Pacific Partnership.

Family ties should be an asset with Chinese migrants now our third-largest source of new citizens. More than 1.8 million Canadians claim Chinese descent. Mandarin and Cantonese are our most spoken languages after English and French. There are nearly 150,000 Chinese students studying in Canada. Chinese-sponsored Confucius Institutes work with our schools and universities. But as Jonathan Manthorpe's Claws of the Panda demonstrates, we also need to monitor Chinese United Front activities aimed at subverting our democracy and our citizens.

China is determined to achieve ultimate sea control in the South China Sea through which 80 per cent of global commerce sails. While endorsing engagement with China, former national security adviser Richard Fadden warned in his recent Vimy Award lecture that China is not just an aggressive competitor but a strategic adversary. Neither our defence policy nor the new ministerial mandate letter reflects this despite the implications for our navy and freedom of navigation.

Chinese treatment of Michael Kovrig and Michael Spavor is abominable. Parliamentarians should endorse the proposed Senate resolution applying the Magnitsky sanctions against the responsible Chinese officials.

In seizing our hostages, the Chinese claim to have acted in "self-defence" over our detention of Huawei executive Meng Wanzhou. In China's eyes, Canada is simply a running dog of American imperialism and, in the continuing Sino-American trade war, we are an unfortunate surrogate. The Chinese embargo of our canola and, until recently, our beef and pork demonstrates to others what China can do.

Under Xi Jinping, China's authoritarian direction is not for turning. China, as its leadership sees it, is resuming its rightful place as the dominant Asian power. Through its Belt and Road initiative and its claims to maritime dominance in adjacent waters, it is re-establishing the Middle Kingdom. Stability depends on the Chinese Communist Party. In their narrative, human rights, as with the rule of law, are not international values but for each state to determine.

China and the West are not engaged in a clash of civilizations and we need to avoid this characterization. Ours is a clash of systems: autocracy against democracy. Look to Hong Kong or Taiwan to know which system the Chinese people chose when given a vote. We should be firmly, vocally on the side of the democrats.

For now, let's use the tools of containment, deterrence and, most of all, engagement. If China curtails official meetings, we'll continue to utilize Track Two dialogue. As with the Soviet Union during the Cold War, the democracies need to act collectively in striving for a peaceful, albeit competitive, co-existence. One goal should be a Helsinki-type accord that includes human rights.

For too long our China policy has swayed between the romantic and the hostile, depending on whether the government is Liberal or Conservative. Its only common thread was a cloak of government secrecy. Inconsistent and opaque policy serves neither our interests nor our values.

If they can park partisanship at the door, the All-Party committee might just achieve a realistic China policy that all can support.

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## Canada as “roadkill on a China-America collision”

Jeremy Kinsman

Policy Magazine, November 30, 2019

It is now a year since Meng Wanzhou, chief financial officer of Huawei Technologies, who is also the daughter of founder Ren Zhengfei, was arrested at Vancouver Airport by the RCMP as she arrived from Hong Kong last Dec. 1 expecting to transfer to a flight to Mexico. It has created a crisis in Canada-China relations and led to the pay-back arrest of two Canadians in China.

The arrest was in response to a “provisional” (i.e. “urgent”) arrest warrant from the U.S. Department of Justice on fraud charges related to violations of U.S. sanctions against Iran.

The U.S. invoked the Canada – U.S. Extradition Treaty, signed in 1971 which is aimed at cross-border criminal activity, people for whom a warrant for arrest has been issued. Ninety per cent of cases, incidentally, are U.S. requests. About 90 per cent, according to DOJ officials, are acceded to. It was not meant for third-country interceptions, such as this case, though they are not excluded.

Canadian Justice officials believe they had no choice but to accede to the request under their obligations under the Treaty.

Having been Canada's Minister at our Washington Embassy in the 1980s for Political, Security, and Legal Affairs, I disagree. There were requests then (1981-85) that were refused by both sides because they did not meet the criteria in the treaty.

The Treaty is very explicit as to these. Article 2 specifies “Persons shall be delivered up according to the provisions of this Treaty for any of the offenses listed in the Schedule annexed to this Treaty... ..provided these offenses are punishable by the laws of both Contracting Parties by a term of imprisonment exceeding one year.”

Article 4c also excludes crimes “of a political character.”

What had she done? The arrest warrant issued Aug 22, 2018 specifies that Ms. Meng had, in a power-point presentation in 2014 in Hong Kong to a group of bankers (HSBC), provided misleading information about Huawei’s corporate relationship to a Chinese company selling communications switching equipment in Iran, then under U.S. sanctions.

This would qualify under item 16 of offences detailed in the Annex to the Treaty that are eligible, “Fraud by a banker, agent, or by a director or officer of any company.” However, the crime alleged cannot be admitted as eligible just by its title. The Treaty specifies “evidence has to be sufficient according to the laws of the place where the person sought shall be found.”

Whatever Ms. Meng communicated in Hong Kong to HSBC (The Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation) with regard ultimately to U.S. sanctions on Iran would almost assuredly not meet the criteria of Art 2 as constituting a crime punishable in Canada by at least one year’s imprisonment.

But there was great urgency. Why? A Globe and Mail report on the anniversary of her arrest details the extent to which national security officials in the U.S. were after Huawei, including White House national security advisor and uber-hawk on China and Iran John Bolton. Moreover, the article reports how the Trump Administration had taken “the shackles” off the Department of Justice and the FBI to properly enforce the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act “to achieve political goals.”

The intelligence that Ms. Meng was coming through YVR was too good to pass up. This would send a major message to China and to Huawei. But they needed Canada to play ball.

Almost anybody with 10 minutes knowledge of the adversarial U.S. policy focus on China and Huawei, and of who Ms. Meng is, would have balked, given the eligibility criteria. Were such people consulted on a move certain to have extreme consequences for Canada? It is unclear.

In 1999, an amendment was made to the administration of the bilateral treaty in the Canadian Department of Justice, in that its administration was delegated from the Minister to officials, and specifically to a dedicated secretariat in Justice. Its operating mandate was to facilitate extraditions. They work within a narrow justice/police community.

The arrest came at a possibly critical time in Canada/U.S. relations over the new NAFTA. To the extent that top officials in the PMO had time to consider the request, they would have been very swayed by a need not to rock that boat, and the Canadian Embassy in Washington would have been seeing this as an opportunity to win points with the locals. In the Nov. 30 Globe piece by Robert Fife and Steven Chase, former Ambassador David MacNaughton says there “was little political involvement at the last minute” because the request “came on us suddenly.” But for what it’s worth, witnesses report MacNaughton was mighty pleased when it happened.

Was Global Affairs consulted, and especially the China experts? No one admits to it. For a while now, Global’s deputy ministers have been newbies from elsewhere in government.

Minister Chrystia Freeland would have got it but she was out of the country.

So, it happened.

When Meng Wanzhou appeared for bail hearings in Vancouver, the Canadian Justice department lawyer who represented the U.S. before the judge went above and beyond to depict her as an unreliable flight risk. All of this excess exacerbated Chinese reaction already abraded by the fact that XI Jinping had met both Donald Trump and Trudeau at a G-20 Summit on Nov. 30 and Dec. 1 just when the ambush of Ms. Meng was being plotted and executed and yet there was no heads-up from either North American leader.

When did Canada inform the Chinese government? Unclear.

And as for the Prime Minister, what did he know and when did he know it? His office initially put out he had been informed days in advance (so as not to leave an impression he didn’t know everything going on, which seemed to be the case over to then-Minister Jody Wilson-Raybould,) but solely for information purposes (given criticism for having “interfered” in the SNC fiasco). Now, the account of advance warning has changed, to “just a few hours.”

Anyway, a few days later, the Chinese arrested Michael Kovrig, a Canadian Foreign Service Officer who had been Political Counsellor at our Embassy in Beijing, and who was now on leave without pay to take on an assignment for the International Crisis Group, and based in Hong Kong. He was in mainland China on a personal break. (I was best man in 1967 at the wedding of Michael’s parents, Prof. Bennett Kovrig and the late Marina Kovrig.)

Then, the Chinese grabbed Michael Spavor, a free-lancing tour operator with unusual ties to North Korea.

The Chinese reaction was appalling. It is, of course, unacceptable. It has seriously eroded China’s image in Canada, leading to angry pieces calling on Canada to scale way back relations with China, and so on.

The Chinese consider our conniving in what they see as the politically-motivated grab of Meng on behalf of the U.S. as being appalling and an indication we are a vassal state.

The Chinese Ambassador says we have to admit our “mistake.” Will they admit theirs, in cynically grabbing Kovrig and Spavor?

The fact is that everybody does dumb stuff some of the time. Chrystia Freeland has loyally tried to make it a rule-of-law issue (“We are. They’re not.”) but it would have been equally rule-of-law to push back at the outset. My friend Mel Cappe, a former Clerk of the Privy Council, has taken a rule-of-law diehard belief stance on this; I think it’s a tough call. But it’s absolutely clear it was made hurriedly, had horrible consequences, and we need an outcome that works.

It’s past time to get past the name-calling and do what has to be done. In 1986, the FBI arrested a Soviet diplomat in New York for spying. Days later, the Soviets arrested the Washington Post Moscow correspondent Nicholas Daniloff. So, talks were held and three weeks later the two were on planes to respective homes. End of story.

Yet, Michael Kovrig and Michael Spavor are still in prison. So, our election’s over, let’s make the deal, Some Canadians will see it as caving in to Chinese “bullying.” What do they propose? Does anyone think the Chinese are remotely impressed by the tepid statements of support from our “allies?”

Of course, the Canadian judge may just let her go in due course. If not, it will be up to the justice minister. But when?

And the Americans? They had their chance – it was proposed to Trudeau he could, in June when they met, offer to Trump the chance to drop the extradition request and use the credit to play in all-important U.S. bilateral trade talks with China. It’s unclear whether Trudeau ever made the proposal.

There is a productive narrative to communicate between Canada and China. There needs to be someone of stature, probably the new Foreign Minister, François-Philippe Champagne, to try. There’s no servility in this. We’re not a super-power. But we count. And we want to count a buoyant economic relationship with China, our second largest trading partner, as essential to our growth. And not negligible to theirs. But on civic values, we differ: there it is. Canada is not for the foreseeable future going to be as friendly as we thought we could be.

Right now, we are roadkill on a China-America collision. And we shouldn’t think either give a damn.

It’s past time to wrap this up.

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## Belliveau: Election's over. Now, who will stand up for Canada's national heritage?

Canadians are shocked that there is no legislative protection for national historic sites or other federally designated heritage properties.

Richard Belliveau

Ottawa Citizen, November 30, 2019



### **24 Sussex Drive is slowly crumbling from neglect. PST**

A new federal cabinet has been named. Now, who will stand up for our national heritage in the capital?

Canadians are shocked that there is no legislative protection for national historic sites or other federally designated heritage properties. We are the only G7 country with no legislative protection for its national treasures. The federal government has been AWOL on this issue.

We've seen the results: 24 Sussex Drive is STILL a vacant shell. Heritage properties protection legislation proposed during the last term of government went nowhere. The financial incentives to restore heritage properties are laughable. The Rideau Canal World Heritage Site is menaced on several fronts. And let's not get started on the Château Laurier National Historic Site.

We were heartened that the Liberal Party platform for the recent election noted that:

*“Preserving Canada’s heritage is essential to understanding the history of our communities, and to fostering a sense of connection between people, yet current legislation offers little direction on how Canada’s heritage places are designated and protected, putting the preservation and care of these important places at risk.”*

The Liberals also said: *“To provide clearer direction on how national heritage places should be designated and preserved, we will move forward with new comprehensive heritage legislation on federally owned heritage places.”*

Heritage Ottawa encourages the new government, with the support of all parties, to do better. And here's how to get moving.

### **1). The government of Canada should get its house in order.**

There should be legislative protection for national historic sites, heritage properties designated by the Federal Heritage Review Office (FHBRO), and Canada's World Heritage Sites, with management plans signed by the ministers of owner-departments and tabled in Parliament, with reporting and accountability. Let's strike a multi-party committee to examine both prime ministerial accommodation and the future of 24 Sussex and not continue with demolition by neglect. The National Capital Commission and Parks Canada need to exert some muscle in protecting heritage in the national capital.

### **2). Financial incentives.**

Federal funding over the years has been very hit-and-miss, which is a shame given the tremendous achievements that can be made with relatively small amounts of money. Other countries and other levels of government have had great success with grants programs or tax incentives. In an era of infrastructure funding, heritage conservation just makes sense. Remember, the greenest building is the one that is already there. Let's see some commitments in the next federal budget.

### **3). Recognition of Indigenous heritage.**

Let's stand up for truth and reconciliation by supporting First Nations, Métis and Inuit heritage. Add their representation to the Historic Sites and Monuments Board of Canada. Commemorate the contributions of Indigenous peoples to Canada's history. Ottawa is, after all, on unceded Algonquin territory.

As Canada's national capital, Ottawa has an abundance of nationally significant structures. To protect them, the government of Canada must get its house in order. The citizens of Ottawa are proud stewards of our national heritage, but we shouldn't have to battle the government to protect heritage places that are significant to the entire nation.

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## Links

Dogs and Diplomacy

Gary Smith

Inside Ottawa Valley, November 30, 2019

<https://www.insideottawavalley.com/news-story/9744924-with-video-from-pets-as-a-soft-power-diplomatic-tool-to-pierre-s-peace-pursuit-perth-s-gary-smith-contributes-to-new-book/>

Ferry de Kerckhove

NATO at Seventy, Radio-Canada December 3, 2019

<http://www.radio-canada.ca/util/postier/suggerer-go.asp?nID=4442056>

<http://www.radio-canada.ca/util/postier/suggerer-go.asp?nID=4442056>

Perspectives Radio-Canada, 21 décembre 2019

<https://ici.radio-canada.ca/tele/24-60/site/episodes/451142/24-60>

Jeremy Kinsman

Impeachment, new NAFTA and Canada-China

CTV News December 10, 2019

<https://www.ctvnews.ca/video?clipId=1851508>

Impeachment, Indian Democracy

CTV News,, December 17, 2019

<https://www.ctvnews.ca/video?clipId=1857133>

## Podcasts

Ukraine: Normandie Summit

Colin Robertson

CGAI Podcast, December 16, 2019

Canada-China relations — one year after Meng Wanzhou and the two Michaels

Colin Robertson, Gordon Houlden, Ted Menzies, and Philip Calvert

CGAI Podcast, December 9, 2019