

Implications of the 2019 federal elections

Ferry de Kerckhove

Frontline Safety and Security, Oct 22, 2019

It is probably a bit early to draw conclusions from the shift to a minority liberal government, but there is no harm in crystal ball gazing from the defence and security perspective.

On the foreign policy side, what matters most, as usual, is Canada-U.S. relations. It is very unlikely that much will change on the Canada-U.S.-Mexico Agreement (CUSMA) until such, unlikely, time when the United States ratifies the new Treaty. Were this to *miraculously* happen in a moment of weakness, or generosity, on the part of Nancy Pelosi in the House of Representatives, there could be attempts by the NDP to ask for more pro-labour measures, or by the Bloc for supply management concessions made to U.S. demands. Although Mr. Scheer denounced the CUSMA's results, there is a consensus, notably underscored by Rona Ambrose, that Prime Minister Trudeau and his team managed a multi-partisan operation, thus very unlikely to unravel. But Mr. Trudeau is lucky that, weakened as he undeniably is today, there will be little focus by the U.S. on Canada over the next 15 months as the presidential electoral maelstrom will consume all the energy within the United States political spectrum – and that is without assuming an impeachment process!

There will be renewed pressure on Canada to be more forceful with **China**, unfortunately to no avail until the Meng Wanzhou extradition case is resolved. Ambassador Barton might feel lonely in Beijing unless the China-U.S. trade war comes to an agreed end and the Huawei CFO is, also *miraculously*, part of the deal in some form or another.

If **Brexit** is consummated in one form or another, there will be an easy consensus on concluding a trade agreement with the UK, whose government could very well also be lurching towards minority status if the Brexit outcome has to be settled at the voting booth. It will be interesting to see what is actually possible in terms of Canada's ability to par both CUSMA and the Canada-EU Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA). Of course, if yet another *miracle* was to happen, whereby the UK remains in the EU, then CETA will remain the paradigm.

Canada will continue to lack any policy towards **Russia**, although there will be serious review of any Russian interference in the recent elections. I expect there will equally be little noise on Canada's views, let alone policy, towards the **Middle East** other than the perfunctory assertions of eternal love for **Israel**.

But more "unimportantly", there will be little in the way of initiatives in traditional foreign policy terms, less ostentatious appearances at summitry / more maturity and discretion, while a stronger, determined approach on **climate change** which, Mr. Scheer's views notwithstanding, remains a unifier with the other parties despite the Canadian divide between East and West.

Clearly, there is no shortage of paradoxes.

Specifically on **defence**, the key issue will be – once again – **procurement**. Indeed, since the July 23rd release of the formal Request for Proposals to acquire 88 advanced fighter jets, pursuant to the *Strong, Secure, Engaged* Defence Policy, the number of contenders has whittled down to **Lockheed Martin's** F-35, **Boeing's** Super Hornet and Sweden's **Saab** Gripen. There are still lingering hard feelings towards Boeing for its earlier rebuff of Canada and, while totally unrelated, the company's recent problems with the 737 Max may have added some concerns in this ethereal quest for perfection. Now that Canada has opted out of its **Industrial and Technological Benefits** (ITB) straightjacket policy, caving to legitimate demands from the U.S. to abide by our \$30 million yearly commitment to contribute to the development of the F35 – which, by the way, generated over a billion dollars' worth of quality business in Canada, it seems that Lockheed Martin has a "lock-in" (poor pun intended) on this bid. And in any event, when "two eyes" trump "five eyes" what does one do with a sixth eye?

As author and former Canadian Air Force fighter pilot, Alan Stephenson explains: "To provide latitude to all bidders, the final RFP was modified into a two-phased proposal to allow non-American companies to address 2/5-EYES challenges up front, while also applying rated criteria for economic offset potential of stated ITB requirements, to keep the F-35 within the bidding process. Additionally, five per cent was shifted from cost to economic criteria to compensate for changes in the original draft ITB policy. The proposals will now be assessed on 60 per cent technical merit, 20 per cent cost and 20 per cent economic benefits."

Key here is the government's decision to change the earlier policy that forces bidders on military contracts to invest as much in Canada as the value of the project they are bidding on. This change allows bidders to define their own industrial targets, and stems from U.S. pressure that Canadian companies are already making loads of money through Canada's participation in the F35 development program, and asserting it should be considered as an alternative to the ITB.

More broadly, defence procurement is unlikely to be sabotaged by the small parties in the new Parliament, although butter vs. guns is always more appealing in the face of a weakened regime. One would reasonably assume that the two-man parties would see eye to eye on military expenditures – unless Mr. Scheer decides that opposition to all and anything is the ultimate channel to keeping his job.

As to the **National Shipbuilding Strategy**, and the frigate program in particular, the usual suspects are solidly in the captain's chair (another lousy pun intended) and **Lockheed Martin** and BAE Systems, of course within the Irving Empire, seem to have little to fear from **Alion** and others.

And if **Donald Trump** ever finds the time, between tweets and the impeachment saga, to look at Canada's defence expenditures as a percentage of GDP, he will be pleased to note that on development assistance, Canada is as lame as the President of the United States

But then, maybe my crystal ball is foggy and none of this – so little – might ever happen at all.

Canada should engage with Taiwan and others given our China troubles

Hugh Stephens

Globe and Mail August 18, 2019

Given the difficult situation between Canada and China since the arrest of Huawei executive Meng Wanzhou, and China's retaliation by detaining two Canadians and blocking or impeding the entry into China of several Canadian exports, commentators have suggested ways Canada could push back. Among them is a reassessment of our relations with Taiwan.

This is the right policy proposal – but we must be careful not to do it for the wrong reasons. We shouldn't seek to do more with Taiwan to strike back at China. We should do it because it is in Canada's interests to engage more fully with Taiwan, which we can do within the existing confines of our one-China policy. For too long, we have trodden very cautiously in developing relations with Taiwan lest we annoy China and imperil Canadian economic prospects in its market. Now is the time to take a more balanced approach, one that has the added benefit of being consistent with Canada's self-proclaimed "progressive" values. Encouraging Taiwan's accession to the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) would be one element of this strategy.

While Taiwan is a member of the World Trade Organization (membership is not contingent on being a sovereign state), most of the trade liberalization initiative these days resides with bilateral or plurilateral negotiations that allow participants to remove trade barriers selectively, bilaterally or within a regional agreement. However, Taiwan has found it difficult to reach such agreements because of China's opposition, despite the fact that China has its own economic partnership with Taiwan.

In the past, a country that had a bilateral trade agreement with China was considered to have the "licence" (from China) to negotiate trade arrangements with Taiwan as long as they were not government-to-government. That was the pattern followed by New Zealand, which signed a free-trade agreement (FTA) with China in 2008 and with Taiwan five years later. As China's attitude to Taiwan hardens, it is not clear whether this level of tolerance still prevails. Even if the pattern of "China first, Taiwan second" remains, it is clear that it will be a very long time, if ever, before Canada and China conclude an FTA. Does that mean Canada's hands are tied on trade issues with Taiwan,

its fifth-largest market in Asia, unless it wants to burn its bridges with China? Fortunately, the Trans-Pacific agreement offers a way forward.

This regional agreement came into force at the end of last year and is now applicable to seven of the 11 signatories. (Chile, Peru, Malaysia and Brunei have yet to ratify it). Canada is already seeing benefits from the partnership in its trade with Japan, among others. Global Affairs Canada has just opened a public consultation on the opportunities for Canada of expanding the agreement, and has identified four economies that have already expressed interest in joining: South Korea, Thailand, Taiwan and, somewhat strangely, Britain. This is a welcome step. Bringing Taiwan into the CPTPP would not only have economic benefits for Canada, it would help consolidate Taiwan's economic role in the Asia-Pacific region, particularly with respect to supply chains and acceptance of high standards of discipline regarding transparency and non-tariff barriers.

While engaging more fully with Taiwan should not be done to tweak the dragon's tail, the current impasse with China does provide the opportunity to reflect more fully on Canadian interests. Those interests include putting Canada-China relations back on track over time, but they also require Canada to examine other elements of its Asia-Pacific strategy. These include continuing to expand our trade with China but also diversifying trade with other Asian economies offering opportunities for Canada, such as Japan, Korea, the members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations – and Taiwan.

China's hard-line and disproportionate retaliation against Canada over Ms. Meng's arrest has demonstrated clearly the risks of putting too many eggs in one basket. China is an attractive alternative to dependency on the U.S. market because of its phenomenal economic growth and market potential, but relying on any one market carries risks. The CPTPP is an opportunity for Canada to mitigate those risks by diversifying our market development efforts to build closer economic relations with trading partners in Asia. Taiwan is a small but not unimportant part of that region, and now is the time for Canada to take advantage of the opportunity to strengthen economic and people-to-people ties with the island democracy.

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CANADA SHOULD ENCOURAGE TAIWAN'S ACCESSION TO THE CPTPP

Hugh Stephens

School of Public Policy, August 28, 2019

Given the ongoing difficult situation that Canada finds itself in our relations with China as a result of the arrest in Vancouver last December of Huawei executive Meng Wanzhou, and China's subsequent retaliation by detaining two Canadians, Michael Kovrig and Michael Spavor, and blocking or impeding the entry into China of several key Canadian exports, several commentators have speculated on what Canada could or should do to push back as part of a new approach to relations with China. Among the actions proposed is the reassessment of our relations with Taiwan, in other words doing more economically and in other areas with the island democracy. This is the right policy proposal—but we must be careful not to do it for the wrong reasons. We shouldn't be

seeking to do more with Taiwan in order to get back at China; rather we should be doing it because it is in Canada's interests to engage more fully with Taiwan within the existing confines of our one-China policy. For too long, we have trodden very cautiously in developing our relations with Taiwan lest we annoy China and imperil Canadian economic prospects in the China market. Now is the time to take a more balanced approach, one that has the added benefit of being consistent with Canada's self-proclaimed "progressive" values. Encouraging Taiwan's accession to the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) would be one element of this strategy.

Taiwan is regarded by China as an inalienable part of the People's Republic, and it considers the island as, in effect, a renegade province even though Taiwan's twenty-three million people are governed by their own legislature and presidential system. At the time that Canada and China established diplomatic relations in 1970, Canada "took note" of China's claim to Taiwan, although it did not "accept" it or "acknowledge" it, (but nor did it challenge it). At the same time, Canada recognized the regime in Beijing as the "sole legal government of China". That was the sort of creative ambiguity that was required at the time to square the circle of Taiwan's separate status with Canada's one-China policy. Over the years, structures have been put in place between Canada and Taiwan to promote relations within the confines of this policy, and Canada has always been scrupulous (some would say too scrupulous) in following both the spirit and the letter of the arrangement with Beijing. This arrangement permits economic and "people to people" ties with Taiwan, but not political or diplomatic engagement. For the past thirty years or so, both Taiwan and Canada have maintained non-diplomatic representative offices in their respective capitals. These offices perform many of the functions of an embassy, but are not considered to constitute a government-to-government relationship.

Even though the number of countries that diplomatically recognize Taiwan is very small, Taiwan operates as a de facto separate jurisdiction. Whether it is in the area of shipping, airlines, health, taxation, environment, trade, immigration, police enforcement, or any other area that requires two jurisdictions to interface with each other, there is a practical need to deal with the Taiwanese authorities. In the case of Canada and other countries that do not recognize Taiwan, this is usually achieved by signing an "arrangement" with Taiwan that falls short of a being a government to government agreement but has the practical effect of dealing with the issues at hand. Canada has such agreements with Taiwan on the avoidance of double taxation and air services, for example.

Trade and investment is a special case. Despite not being in Beijing's eyes a sovereign power, Taiwan is nonetheless a full-fledged member of the World Trade Organization (WTO) as it is a separate customs territory from China. Sovereign status is not required to be a WTO member. (Hong Kong and Macau, both parts of China, are also separate members of the WTO). But being a member of the WTO is not enough to address many trade barriers today. In light of the WTO's current inability to effectively deal with a number of trade issues, there has been a trend to bilateral or plurilateral trade agreements between countries in order to remove trade barriers selectively, but Taiwan has found it difficult to reach such agreements because of China's opposition. This is

despite the fact that China has signed its own Economic Partnership Agreement with Taiwan, which has been in effect since 2010.

In the past it was considered that a country that had achieved a bilateral trade agreement with China then had the “licence” (from China) to proceed to negotiate a non-diplomatic trade agreement with Taiwan. That was the pattern followed by New Zealand, which signed a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with China in 2008 and with Taiwan five years later. Singapore, which has a pre-existing FTA with China, also later reached an agreement with Taiwan. Today, with China’s hardening attitude to Taiwan it is not clear whether the previous tolerance by China for bilateral agreements with Taiwan still prevails. Even if the pattern of “China first, Taiwan second” still prevailed, it is clear that it will be a very long time, if ever, before Canada and China ever conclude an FTA. In fact, it may be a very long time, given current political relations between the two, before *even the negotiation* of an FTA is once again contemplated. Does that mean that Canada’s hands are tied in dealing on trade issues with Taiwan, its fourth largest market in Asia? Fortunately there is a way forward.

That opportunity is the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) which came into force at the end of last year and is now applicable to seven of the eleven signatories. (Chile, Peru, Malaysia and Brunei have yet to ratify the agreement. The other members are Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, Singapore, Vietnam and Mexico). Canada is already seeing benefits from the CPTPP in its trade with Japan, among others. Global Affairs Canada has just opened a public consultation on the opportunities for Canada of CPTPP expansion, and has specifically identified four economies that have already expressed interest in joining the CPTPP; South Korea, Thailand, Taiwan and, somewhat strangely, the United Kingdom. While the consultation specifically mentions these four countries, comments can be submitted on the potential succession of “any other Asia-Pacific economy”. This is a welcome step. The accession of Taiwan to the CPTPP would not only bring economic benefits to Canada but would help consolidate Taiwan’s economic role in the Asia-Pacific region, particularly with respect to supply chains and acceptance of high standards of discipline with respect to transparency and non-tariff barriers. Since Australia, New Zealand and Singapore already have Free Trade Agreements with China, and Vietnam, Malaysia and Brunei have an arrangement with China through ASEAN, it will be difficult for China to oppose widening an existing regional agreement to include Taiwan, as long as others are accepted at the same time. Japan has already expressed its support for Taiwanese accession. While many of the other CPTPP countries have not yet taken an official position, Canada can help build support within the organization.

Taiwan is not going to be able roll back China’s diplomatic offensive that is trying to strip it of the few remaining micro-states that officially recognize it, nor will it be possible for Canada or other nations that have established relations with Beijing to expand contacts with Taiwan into the political space. The U.S., which traditionally has somewhat more leeway in its relations with Taiwan, may continue arms sales. Canada should not go there. What we should do is to exploit actively and fully the legitimate and accepted channels to promote closer relations between Canada and the people of Taiwan. That means building on the existing bilateral “arrangements” already in place to include areas such as investment promotion and protection and taking advantage of an

opportunity like the CPTPP to encourage Taiwan (technically the “Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu”) into further liberalization of its trade regime, and bringing into it alignment with the best practices subscribed to by Canada and other members of the CPTPP.

While engaging more fully with Taiwan should not be done to tweak the dragon’s tail, the current impasse with China does provide us with the opportunity to reflect more fully on Canadian interests. Those interests certainly include putting Canada-China relations back on track over time, but they also require Canada to examine other elements of its Asia-Pacific strategy. China will continue to play a large part in this strategy, but we also need to step up our trade linkages and promotion with other economies offering opportunities for Canada, such as Japan, Korea, the ASEAN nations—and Taiwan.

China’s hardline and disproportionate retaliation against Canada over the Meng Wanzhou affair has demonstrated clearly the risks of putting too many eggs into one basket. China is an attractive alternative to dependency on the U.S. market because of its phenomenal economic growth and market potential, but dependency on any one market carries risks. The CPTPP is an opportunity for Canada to mitigate those risks by diversifying our market development efforts to build closer economic relations with a number of trading partners in the Asia region. Taiwan is a small but not unimportant part of that region, and now is the time for Canada to take advantage of the opportunity to strengthen economic and people-to-people ties with the island democracy.

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Star Wars: Coming soon to a space near you – the diplomatic alternative

Paul Meyer


CIPS, October 3, 2019

Will Outer Space become a new frontier for international conflict? Or can it remain a global commons? As states dither, this question may soon be taken over by other actors.

I confess that I gave this blog its title with a bit of tongue in cheek. While the media apparently insists on invoking this misleading Hollywood moniker from the 1980s whenever the topic of space security comes up, its recurrence does hint at the messiness created by the rhetoric and actions of leading space powers.

For much of the half-century we refer to as ‘the space age’, rival powers have displayed a significant degree of restraint in their activity in outer space despite an ongoing

competition between them. This situation is primarily thanks to one of the great, if now largely unsung, diplomatic accomplishments of the 20th century: the Outer Space Treaty of 1967 (with its 107 states parties). This treaty established a unique status for outer space as a “global commons” over which no claim of sovereignty or national appropriation would be allowed. Furthermore, the treaty specifies that activity in space should be “for peaceful purposes” and “for the benefit and in the interests of all countries”. This peaceful orientation was reinforced by the treaty’s prohibition on stationing weapons of mass destruction in outer space as well as its ban on any militarization of the moon and other celestial bodies. A distinct air of international cooperation is evident throughout the treaty. It includes provisions for observation of space launches, visits to installations in space as well as reporting to the public and the international scientific community on the results of space activity.



Time Magazine cover, Apr. 4, 1983 (Fair use: limited non-profit and educational)

Perhaps the best manifestation of this cooperative spirit is the International Space Station with its multi-national crew. At the same time, this cooperation is under a major assault in other fields of space activity. Indeed, in recent years unilateral assertions that outer space has become “a war-fighting domain”, in which the pursuit of military “dominance” is the crucial objective, have become more prominent. However, the vast majority of states continue to maintain that an arms race in outer space should be prevented. Moreover, since the early 1980s, they have voiced that conviction in an annual resolution adopted by the UN General Assembly by a wide margin (only the US and Israel have voted against the most recent iteration of this resolution).

Learn More: [Speeding towards the Abyss: Contemporary Arms Racing and Global Security](#)

This resolution supports the legal regime set out in the Outer Space Treaty but expresses the need “to consolidate and reinforce that regime and enhance its effectiveness”. It calls for “further measures” to prevent an arms race in space and enjoins states “to refrain from actions contrary to that objective”. The resolution explicitly calls for further measures to prevent “the weaponisation of outer space” (the Outer Space Treaty prohibits only Weapons of Mass Destruction, but it is silent on other types of weaponry).

The vast majority of states continue to maintain that an arms race in outer space should be prevented.

Despite the clear policy direction from the international community, progress in realising these goals has been meagre to date. The Conference on Disarmament – the 65-nation forum in Geneva that is supposed to be the UN’s venue for the negotiation of multilateral arms control and disarmament agreements – has been moribund for over 20 years. It remains trapped in a Gordian knot produced by its consensus rule constraint which effectively allows any state to veto any decision. This situation has been detrimental for any official work on the CD’s agenda item on outer space security. The forum has only been able to engage in *ad hoc* “informal” discussions on space which go nowhere. The CD was also the chosen venue for the one major treaty proposal on space security developed in the last decade – the Sino-Russian draft treaty on the Prevention of Placement of Weapons in Outer Space (better known by its acronym PPWT). Given

the CD's gridlock, no sustained work has been done on this draft, although it has attracted severe criticism from the US.

States that are looking for more viable avenues for space security diplomacy have tried several other options. The EU initiated in 2008 a promising *International Code of Conduct on Outer Space Activities*. This initiative "failed to launch" in 2015 after encountering stiff opposition from the BRICS grouping of states which insisted that any such negotiation would have to be conducted under a UNGA mandate.

The work of a UN Group of Governmental Experts was more productive. It looked at Transparency and Confidence Building Measures for outer space and produced in 2013 a consensus report recommending a menu of such measures. The geopolitical climate was already starting to deteriorate at that time, and little take-up by states of the GGE's recommendations has occurred.

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A further Group of Governmental Experts examining possible legal elements of an agreement to prevent an arms race was established in 2018-19. Yet it was unable to release a report due to the last-minute opposition of the United States representative. The UN's Committee on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, an 89-member state forum in Vienna, achieved an agreement for a set of voluntary guidelines regarding the sustainability of space activity, although both the body and the guidelines eschew space security matters.

So, at a time when arguably developing diplomatic alternatives to a rising chorus preparing for space warfare should be a priority task, the current international scene is devoid of initiative.

Canada, once a champion of the non-weaponization of space and originator of several constructive proposals for confidence-building measures, has been missing in action for a decade. The EU having fumbled its *International Code of Conduct*, shows no sign of wanting to pick up the ball again. Our use of and dependence on space is growing exponentially, and yet we see scant activity to preserve this unique, benign environment from human-made threats.

Irresponsible state conduct in outer space could be devastating for their business, not to mention humanity's well-being.

Although I believe it is incumbent on the states that are parties to the Outer Space Treaty to uphold its provisions and defend its goal of international cooperation, not

confrontation, in outer space, their inaction may spur other non-governmental stakeholders to come forward. As we are witnessing in a parallel realm of cybersecurity, the private sector and civil society are becoming more active on policy and security issues. They recognize that irresponsible state conduct in outer space could be devastating for their business, not to mention humanity's well-being. It will require more consistent advocacy; however, on the part of such stakeholders if peaceful access to and operations in outer space are to be preserved.

Canada cannot cut foreign aid. We're already not doing enough

Colin Robertson

Globe and Mail, October 2, 2019

Canadians think of this country as having a big heart. After all, we now accept more refugees than Donald Trump's America. But when it comes to foreign aid – which largely helps the poor, the sick and the destitute, most of whom are women and children – we are downright miserly.

The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) currently places Canada's official development assistance commitment at 0.28 per cent of gross national income, representing about 25 cents for every \$100. To put that in historical context, from 1970 to 1995, Canada committed about 46 cents for every \$100 of national income – 75 per cent more than we do today. Justin Trudeau's Liberal government embraced a feminist development policy, but that mostly reallocated rather than added new monies. Canadian aid is not growing in real terms.

Our UN Security Council seat competitors are outdoing us. Norway stands at 0.94 per cent and Ireland at 0.31 per cent, which is the OECD average. The organization has already told Canada that our words need to be matched by "concrete action to increase aid flows."

And now, according to Conservative Leader Andrew Scheer, a Tory government would cut even that by 25 per cent.

Fifty years ago, Lester Pearson got it right when he argued the case for aid: "The simplest answer is the moral one, that it is only right for those who have to share with those who do not."

Mr. Pearson identified aid as part of “enlightened and constructive self-interest” in an increasingly interdependent world. He recommended a goal of 0.7 per cent of GDP for foreign aid, and that remains the benchmark for the OECD, Group of Seven and United Nations. Canada has never achieved the target, although it came close under prime ministers Brian Mulroney and Pierre Trudeau.

No doubt, foreign aid can be a hard sell to domestic voters. The idea of giving away money to other countries is one that suffers from compassion fatigue, and there are certainly problems around transparency and accountability.

But foreign aid works. In the wake of a disaster, it provides immediate relief, in the form of food, medicine and relief workers such as Doctors without Borders. It also offers a hand-up – teaching how to fish, farm and, increasingly, digital skills – that feeds aid recipients for life.

There are benefits to lending a hand, too. The United States’ aid-driven Marshall Plan resurrected Western Europe after the Second World War and boosted our economy when it allowed loan money to be directed to Canadian goods. Since then, our trade and investment with the European Union only grows. The Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership is just the latest dividend generated in no small measure by Canada’s historic generosity through the multinational Colombo Plan, which took aim at poverty in Asia.

When the UN set out its millennium goals in 1990, there was lots of talk about whether its grasp exceeded reach. But by 2015, it turned out that those living in extreme poverty had declined by half. So, too, had the mortality rate for kids under 5. The working middle class – living on more than US\$4 a day – nearly tripled.

Now, we have a new set of sustainable development goals for 2030 that includes ending poverty and hunger, as well as establishing gender equality. They’re ambitious aims, but they’re doable – as long as countries such as Canada continue to give.

Whichever party forms our next government needs a passionate advocate as Canada’s next international development minister. That person needs to clearly tell the public why Canadian foreign aid is vital. Every speech should answer three questions: Does aid work? Where can Canadian aid make the greatest difference? And what results should Canadians expect over the next decade?

With democracy under threat, good governance matters again. The Liberals have promised a new centre for peace, order and good government, but rather than create anew, why not make better use of existing institutions such as the Parliamentary Centre? And beyond money, we can share our competence and capability in harnessing energy, growing food and water stewardship.

Other OECD members are also reforming aid delivery by working with the private sector. We could learn from Australia’s Innovation Xchange experience.

Working with various organizations, the Canadian Council for International Co-operation will co-host a conference this November to look at development assistance. Their recommendations should serve as reference points for our next government.

Meanwhile, Andrew Scheer should talk to fellow conservatives Joe Clark, Brian Mulroney and Stephen Harper. They understood the value of foreign aid in advancing Canadian interests. They understood that foreign aid is not yesterday's cause.

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Links

Jeremy Kinsman

China: Seventy Years of Communism

CTV News, October 1, 2019

<https://www.ctvnews.ca/video?clipId=1794307>

US Withdrawal from Syria

CTV News, October 7, 2019

<https://www.ctvnews.ca/video?clipId=1799885>

Trump and Syria, Brexit

CTV News, October 15, 2019

<https://www.ctvnews.ca/video?clipId=1805025>

Trudeau Minority Government Foreign Policy Implications

CTV News, October 22, 2019

<https://www.ctvnews.ca/video?clipId=181068>

Colin Robertson

Canadians in Hong Kong

CGAI Podcast. September 30, 2019

[“There’s about 300,000 Canadians living in Hong Kong” - the protests and more](#)

Canadian Election and Foreign Policy

CGAI Podcast, October 15, 2019

[The Canadian election and the future of foreign policy](#)

Ferry de Kerckhove

Brexit

Radio-Canada, October 21, 2019

<https://ici.radio-canada.ca/premiere/emissions/Les-matins-d-ici>