

Taking a Breath to Avoid a New Cold War

Jeremy Kinsman

Policy Magazine, March 2019

While much of the world's attention is monopolized by the geopolitical shiny object of Donald Trump, the two players who warrant equally careful consideration are Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping, whose evolving countries have more in common than many Western caricatures capture. Veteran Canadian diplomat Jeremy Kinsman deftly lays out their crucial similarities and differences, and how the West can move past suspicion to collaboration.

Each February, heavy-hitters in international security from both sides of the Atlantic, mostly ex-cold warriors and the guardians of foreign policy conventional wisdom—once dubbed “the blob” by former Obama advisor Ben Rhodes—convene at Munich’s venerable Hotel Bayerischer Hof to rake over trends and threats.

After 9/11, concern veered to the long war with jihadists, and chaos in the Middle East. But now the blob’s angst is reverting to the old foes of the Euro-Atlantic order: a resentful and reawakened post-Soviet Russia; and a spectacularly risen China, embarked on a transformational competition for global power.

Worry over Russia and China is deepened by anguish over the evacuation of American leadership.

Vice President Mike Pence’s talking points put America forward as the staunch leader of the “free world.” Traditional allies, bruised by Trump’s lying, disruption, and defection from defining international cooperation agreements, sat in stony dismissive silence.

German Chancellor Angela Merkel, who, despite having booked retirement for 2021, remains the West’s leadership voice, stood up for the essential vision and practice of global cooperation that Trump’s proxies were trashing. Like-minded democracies including Canada are game for her defence of multilateralism and democracy, to push back against populist nationalism.

For Americans, Russia and China are the main adversaries. Though very different, they share some attitudes, notably a coolness to liberal internationalism that reflects resentment that their own interests and revived stature get sparse recognition under U.S.-made rules set decades ago without their influence.

Both exploit competition for global primacy as U.S. domination recedes. In the late 1940s, the U.S. accounted for 50 per cent of the world's GDP. Today, it is about 22 per cent, nearly equaled by China's GDP, which has multiplied 80 times since reforms began in 1978.

Russia is not in China's economic league, but has certainly made a comeback as an international security spoiler.

Of course, the U.S. remains the dominant military force by metrics of hard power assets deployed over multiple strategic platforms around the world. But such hard power is undercut by cheaper and arguably more powerful cyberweaponry that both Russia and China have adroitly deployed at a fraction of the cost.

Strategic competition is increasingly defined by vastly accelerated 5-G computing capabilities driving the next generation of technological advance. By means fair and arguably unfair, China has caught up enough to challenge American tech primacy.

Backed up by economic and political leverage, the U.S. government proselytizes against the security risks of letting major Chinese telecom competitor Huawei consolidate footholds in western and developing economies.

A negative view of China's rivalry may be the only policy thrust both U.S. political parties agree on. Anti-Russian sentiment rides even higher, though with highly partisan slants because of a split in appraising Russia's influence on the 2016 election. Far from ducking their adversarial roles, Chinese and Russian leaders vaunt them at home, as popular payback for dismissive treatment by the West in the past.

A communications war has prompted phobic narratives to take hold. Scholars and commentators who search for objective truth and understanding amid competing historical narratives, perceptions, and national purposes have been derided even in Canada, as agents of (Russian or Chinese) influence.

We need to recover perspective through a more balanced understanding of respective histories and to develop strategic relationships that can advance the rules of the road, within which wrongdoing on human rights and intimidation of neighbours can be challenged without a megaphone.

Historically, Russia and China experienced seismic communist revolutions that produced totalitarian nightmares, and differing counter-revolutions. Russia's counter-revolution in the 1980s and 90s was unprecedented in the scale and complexity of the task of displacing 70 years of police state control with the openness of *glasnost*. Gorbachev's moral choice was to reform the country's political structures as a first priority, before restructuring the economy.

Reformers undid the communist system but under-estimated the challenge of developing democratic norms and behaviour. The Russian economy contracted by a third—more than the U.S. economy did in the 1930s Great Depression—aggravated by

clueless advice on austerity and privatization and inadequate support from the West, ultimately depleting Russian public support for reformers.

Soviet statehood collapsed. A superpower of 500 million, of whom only 50 per cent were Russian, was replaced by 15 ethno-centric republics, stranding 20 million Russians outside the Russian Republic. The relatively peaceful break-up indicated the extent of alienation from the Soviet communist regime, and the strength of revived ethnic nationalism.

That Gorbachev ended the Cold War and ideological competition is not regretted in Russia. But the thought that Russians were the “losers” and Americans the “winners” remains a bitter pill, deepened by belief that NATO countries (with the exception of Germany) discounted the interests of Russians, seeming to consign them to a “failing state” international outbox.

In 2000, disappointment, exhaustion from chaotic “reforms” and increasing violence enabled Putin’s inaugural bargain with Russians to set aside civic dispute in return for security and stability. He subtracted newly-acquired democratic space but administered a popular stabilizing economic recovery.

China’s overall reform priority had been the opposite of Russia’s moral but unmanageable choice of politics before economics. When Deng Xiaoping unleashed economic reforms in 1978 he kept the reins of political control tightly in the hands of the Communist Party, and further tightened them after the Tiananmen protests in 1989. China’s subsequent, unprecedented economic rise lifted more than half a billion citizens out of poverty. Now, both economies face problems. Economically, Russia is overly dependent on natural resources. China has massive debt. Growth is slowing in both as the welfare needs of aging populations swell. In both countries, wide income disparities galvanize the toxic issue of unfairness, sharpened by the perception of widespread corruption, though XI has launched a popular if selective anti-corruption drive.

Politically, the triumphalism of both Putin and Xi is more muted. They both invoke worry about internal stability, referencing past violent upheaval to justify tightening controls on dissent, rationalizing that freedoms still exist to a degree unthinkable under totalitarian communism.

But suppression of dissent on open media risks resentment over abuse of power. In both Russia and China, disaffection from professional and urban elites is joined by local protests from citizens frustrated with top-down over-centralization, official corruption, and environmental degradation. Russia still does polling: Putin’s approval rating has dropped into the 30s. Both concoct or amplify external threats to boost nationalistic support, appealing to collective memory of historic vulnerability to invasion to rationalize the need for neutralized buffer zones.

Their respective global ambitions are different in scale. Russia wants the respect and influence due a great country. China’s grander, epochal vision includes recovering the historic position as a regional hegemon that preceded what it considers the anomaly of

European and then American pre-eminence of the mere last few hundred years. Both refuse to go along with a self-awarded U.S. exclusivity on the international use of force. They are vibrantly hostile to perceived interference and criticism from “hypocritical” democracies they accuse of “missionary” subversion of sovereign rights, including via “colour revolutions” they see as Western-sponsored attempts to weaken them. As nationalists, their view of institutionalized globalism is wary of political bias favouring Western competitors. But they work to enhance their rewards from the system, and reject the American notion they have been “free riders.”

Overall, China’s challenge to American primacy is the greatest geopolitical drama of our age. Though advanced primarily through economics, its military dimension centres on its aggressive claim of a vast territorial sea off its 3,000-mile southern coastline adjacent to vital shipping lanes, buttressed by military deployments meant to deny American access to waters the U.S. Navy has considered since 1945 to be akin to a vast “American lake.”

Both countries seem over-extended by risky moves—Russian election interference and the Skripal affair; China’s political hostage-taking over the Huawei drama and intimidation of overseas diasporas. Confidence levels may be jarred. Putin and Xi might be chuffed by a recent Gallup world poll showing both are more trusted internationally than the U.S. But they have to factor in the costs of growing public animosity in Europe and North America. Can we foresee some moderation? If so, how does the internationalist West engage with them?

We need candid discussion with and about Russia and China. They know the score and know they aren’t making the gains they were a few years ago. While both sought advantageous transactional deals with the U.S., they basically rely on an interdependent and predictably stable world institutional system, which is our aim as well. We need to lower the temperature and hope for the moderation of phobic and defensive public opinion on all sides.

Canada’s recent loss of productive relationships with both Russia and China is their loss, ours, and the international community’s since there are no solutions to multiple international stalemates without Russian and Chinese cooperation, including the conflict with Ukraine. So, when the blob returns to Munich next February, and in discussion everywhere between now and then, the dominant challenges will be how to mute the nationalist static now in the world’s ears, and how to coax the world community, including Russia and China, back onto the axis of essential global cooperation.

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Why Limit Pipeline Choices for Alberta Oil?
Robert Hage
IRPP Policy Options Magazine, April 2, 2019

The proposed tanker moratorium would kill any hope of an Indigenous-owned pipeline crossing BC, although it is a viable option.

he federal government had three pipeline options to ship Alberta's oil to the West Coast. It cancelled one (Northern Gateway) and is in the process of shutting down another (First Nations Eagle Spirit Energy Corridor). It is left with the most challenging environmental option, the expansion of the [Trans Mountain pipeline to Vancouver](#). The government has put all of its eggs in the Trans Mountain basket ([it now owns it](#)). Although the National Energy Board (NEB) has approved the Trans Mountain expansion for the second time, the project is meeting stiff opposition from environmentalists, the cities of Burnaby and Vancouver, and coastal First Nations. The government is currently engaged in court-ordered consultations, and it is facing a [BC government court challenge](#).

In the meantime, the government is actively pursuing Senate passage of [Bill C-48](#), [the West Coast Oil Tanker Moratorium Act](#). Peter Harder, Government Representative in the Senate, says the act will simply enshrine in law "the longstanding moratorium on bulk shipments of crude oil along the northern coast of BC." But there is no such moratorium: there is, however, a tanker corridor that (voluntarily) keeps Alaskan tankers 100 nautical miles off the BC coast. It has nothing to do with BC's northern coast, which is where the new legislation would apply.



If Bill C-48 proceeds, it will put an end to the Eagle Spirit Energy Corridor, which would run from the oil sands across Indigenous lands to BC's northern coast, along with Indigenous peoples' hopes for a better economic future.

In 2002, Calgary's Enbridge Northern Gateway began feasibility studies and public consultations on a pipeline from the oil sands to a west coast terminal, which was to ship Alberta crude to Asian refineries and markets. Four years later, the federal Minister of the Environment appointed an independent review panel to work with the NEB to assess the Northern Gateway proposal.

The panel heard from hundreds of participants in 21 communities, including First Nations; reviewed 175,000 pages of evidence; and received 9,000 letters. It determined that, overall, "Canada and Canadians would be better off with the Enbridge Northern

Gateway than without it.” In May 2014, the Harper government accepted the panel’s recommendation to approve the proposal for pipeline and its Kitimat terminal on BC’s northern coast.

During the 2015 fall election campaign, Liberal Leader Justin Trudeau vowed to ban tankers from BC’s northern coast and to stop the Northern Gateway project. The Federal Court of Appeal ruled that the Harper government had failed to fully consult First Nations on Northern Gateway. The new government did not appeal this decision, but it passed an order-in-council to put an end to the project. The government subsequently reimbursed Enbridge \$14.7 million for its regulatory fees, but offered nothing toward the company’s \$373 million in lost costs.

The federal government went a step further. In May 2017, it introduced Bill C-48, a law that would ban tankers carrying crude oil from stopping or unloading at ports along the BC coast between Alaska and the northern tip of Vancouver Island, as well as at Haida Gwaii. (It allowed tankers to use BC’s southern ports and waters.)

The Bill passed in the House of Commons last year and is being debated in the Senate. From the beginning, nine First Nations who see an energy corridor not as an intrusion but as an opportunity for economic development — a seemingly unlikely group — opposed the Bill. They created a chief’s council to administer the Eagle Spirit Energy

voluntary tanker route that applies only to Alaskan tankers 100 miles off BC's coast be called a crude-oil moratorium that applies to waters along the BC coast?

The goal of Bill C-48 is entirely new: to ban crude-oil tankers from using Canadian ports along the northern BC coast. Even the Sierra Club, in its submission in support of Bill C-48, stated the Bill would do nothing to stop existing petroleum tank barges passing by BC's north coast in transit between Alaska and Washington State, as they do not stop at BC ports. Even the Canadian Coast Guard, in its October 6, 2017 advisory, [says the exclusion zone](#) "does not apply to tankers travelling to or from Canadian ports."

In 1972, the federal government announced a proposed moratorium on crude oil traffic through the north coast's Dixon Entrance, Hecate Strait and Queen Charlotte Sound off Haida Gwaii. This moratorium was never put into law for the very good reason that the US contests the status of these waters. Since the 1890s, Canada has claimed that the waters of Dixon Entrance immediately south of the Alaskan panhandle are internal waters of Canada. It has extended that claim southward to include Hecate Strait and Queen Charlotte Sound.

Under international law, Canada could only impose and enforce a tanker ban in these waters, particularly at Dixon Entrance, if they were considered internal waters of Canada, which the US opposes.

The US has sent a series of diplomatic notes over the years contesting all these claims and has even drawn boundaries for its own territorial sea in Dixon Entrance. Under international law, Canada could only impose and enforce a tanker ban in these waters, particularly at Dixon Entrance, if they were considered internal waters of Canada, which the US opposes. Bill C-48 attempts to avoid this difficulty by applying the moratorium only to ships entering or leaving Canadian ports where Canada has uncontested control.

In April 2018, the coastal Lax Kw'alaams First Nation, part of the Eagle Spirit group, [filed a legal challenge against Canada and BC, asking for a court declaration](#) that if Bill C-48 passes, it would have no effect in Lax Kw'alaams territory, which includes Grassy Point, near Prince Rupert, where a planned terminal would go. If Bill C-48 becomes law and their legal challenge fails, the Trans Mountain pipeline expansion will be the only remaining pipeline proposal to transport oil from Alberta to the west coast. However, Trans Mountain's [Burnaby terminal](#), which is part of the Port of Vancouver, is not ideal as a west coast terminal. The Port of Vancouver is Canada's busiest port. Last year, it shipped a record 142 million tons of grain, chemicals, containers, bulk goods and crude oil. Approximately 250 vessels a month use the port, but only 2 percent are oil tankers. The Trans Mountain expansion will increase the full capacity of the pipeline system from 300,000 barrels a day to 890,000 barrels a day. This would result in a seven-fold increase in the number of oil tankers using the Burnaby terminal, to around 34 per month (14 percent of total ship traffic). By comparison, the areas around [Northern Gateway's now-abandoned port at Kitimat](#) and [Eagle Spirit's yet-to-be-developed Grassy Point](#) terminal are relatively free of congestion.

Petroleum is by far Canada's largest export. Over the past 10 years, oil has allowed Alberta to provide a total of \$220 billion in transfers to the rest of Canada – almost three times more than Ontario. Expanding Alberta's oil markets beyond the United States by pipeline to the west coast is, as the NEB noted, for the benefit of all Canadians.

Getting Alberta's oil to west coast terminals should be seen as not just a provincial or regional project but a nation-building project. Canadians have an interest in seeing Trans Mountain proceed. In the event it does not, however, the government should not needlessly shut down the Eagle Spirit Energy Corridor, [a viable alternative route on First Nations' lands with First Nations in control](#). It is essential that Bill C-48 be either defeated or amended to exempt Lax Kw'alaams Nation's territory and the development of the Grassy Point terminal.

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Charest and Horton: A path towards internal free trade in

Canada

Let's propose that any service or profession that meets the requirement of one province meets the requirement of another.

JEAN CHAREST & DEANNA HORTON

Ottawa Citizen, April 11, 2019

It's time for free trade in Canada. The way to do this is through recognition of equivalence in standards and credentials for our professions. Our premiers could collectively endorse this principle and even agree to its implementation by July 1, 2020.

We easily forget that a significant slice of goods, services and labour faces barriers in crossing provincial borders. Every once in a while, for example when a person is arrested for transporting alcohol across provincial lines, a spotlight is shone upon these internal trade restrictions. And yet internal trade represents, for most provinces within Canada, on average about 20 per cent of their GDP. In a study done by Statistic Canada in 2017, it was determined that internal trade barriers on both goods and services represented the equivalent of a seven-per-cent tariff.

In 2016, provincial premiers agreed in principle on a new Canadian Free Trade agreement (CFTA). They have since mandated Premiers Stephen McNeil of Nova Scotia and Brian Pallister of Manitoba to lead this initiative and to coordinate with provincial and territorial trade ministers. The issue is how we develop integrative manufacturing and services value chains to take real advantage of recently completed trade agreements such as CPTPP (Asia-Pacific) and CETA (Europe) while making North America more of a common market under CUSMA, the new Canada-U.S.-Mexico trade deal.

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Provincial regulatory authorities and professional organizations usually take a protectionist stance when asked by their provincial leaders to find a way to accommodate other jurisdictions. This is a natural reflex; regulators want to ensure the safety and viability of their products or services. But, surely, if international negotiators are able to overcome these hurdles, provincial authorities should be able to do the same.

A good answer to this challenge is a system of equivalence that would allow the acceptance of differences. In free trade agreements that cover what are known as technical barriers to trade, different jurisdictions accept that the standards referenced in regulations are equivalent if they have the same effect. And then organizations can certify that the requirements of these regulations have been met. When consumers see the Canadian Standards Association mark on a product plugged in to an electrical socket, they can be assured that the product is safe.

Similarly, when citizens go for a doctor's appointment in Canada, they shouldn't need to worry that the doctor is not qualified. Is there a qualitative difference between going to a doctor in Alberta and Ontario? We would argue not. And if you are hiring a plumber, are plumbers in Ontario better than those in Quebec?

Is there a qualitative difference between going to a doctor in Alberta and Ontario? We would argue not.

Provincial regulators regularly incorporate standards by reference, and these standards are often accepted internationally as well. But the progress that has been made in manufactured products has not been matched in services and professions. The original FTA and NAFTA began the process of recognition of qualifications to allow certain professions to be hired in NAFTA countries. Architects, for example.

So, let's just propose that any service or profession that meets the requirement of one province meets the requirement of another. We should ask each province to make the case for any exception to this rule. Requirements can be different, but they should be recognized as equivalent. That would mean that provincial bureaucrats would not have to spend countless hours negotiating the wording of a new, common regulation.

Provinces and municipalities naturally want to promote local businesses and there is nothing inherently wrong with that. However, businesses from other provinces should be able to compete for contracts and be evaluated in a transparent manner. In the long run, government budgets lose out by paying a premium for products and services that may not be competitive. Opening up procurement on a reciprocal basis would be an excellent first step.

What would these measures mean for Canadian citizens and businesses?

Pipe fitters who are qualified in Alberta could work in Ontario, and, as would be the case for all skilled trades, this would open up opportunities for skilled tradespeople across the country. Cross-provincial skills recognition would also encourage a more efficient rationalization of education and skills training to create real centres of excellence.

The same would go for doctors and lawyers. Businesses would be able to access a larger pool of potential employees, companies could compete for business in other provinces. Canada would be the better for it. And yes, Canadians would be able to enjoy their drink of choice.

China has taken our citizens and canola producers hostage. Here's how Ottawa can muscle up

Colin Robertson The Globe and Mail April 22, 2019

For months, both Canadian citizens and a key part of the Canadian economy have been held hostage by China. After Canada's detention of Huawei executive Meng Wanzhou, Beijing responded; for nearly 150 days, Michael Spavor and Michael Kovrig have been jailed, denied legal representation, forced to endure **sleep deprivation** and, in the case of the latter, had his diplomatic immunity abused as an on-leave Canadian foreign-service officer. Beijing then claimed that our canola is infected by pests. That canola embargo is a double whammy: It cuts our current market in half, and also sows doubt among Canadians about our health and safety standards.

If the Trudeau government continues to let this pass without response, we can expect the Chinese to ratchet up the pressure. Our beef, pork and seafood could be next. It's due time for more muscular action.

To address the canola embargo, we need to implement a food chain and inspection system that is the best in the world. We need to show foreign customers and Canadians alike that our food is of the highest quality and that "Made in Canada" is a signal of a premium brand.

Prime Minister Justin Trudeau is sending a minister-led delegation to demonstrate to Chinese authorities that Canadian canola is pest-free. To prepare for the inevitably long waits to see Chinese officials, the delegation should read Lord Macartney's **account** of his 1793 mission to China's emperor, which was unsuccessful because of the deep divides between the two sides.

The success of any Canadian mission will not come in China, but in visits to markets of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership. To help those efforts, we should redeploy the trade commissioners recently added to China to those markets instead.

The United States needs to do more to help with the detained Canadians. Our unenviable position stems from Washington's extradition request of Ms. Meng, and that process, governed by the rule of law, was needlessly complicated when Donald Trump mused about including her in a China-U.S. trade deal. But if there is a deal, the U.S. must receive assurances that Mr. Kovrig and Mr. Spavor will be freed.

Canada should take the plight of the hostages to the various international human-rights tribunals and encourage human-rights NGOs to include them in their advocacy. We are championing the displaced Rohingya; why not press the cause of the million-plus Uyghurs kept in Chinese concentration camps? It will demonstrate to China that size does not mean a pass on human rights.

We should apply Magnitsky sanctions against those responsible for depriving the two Canadians of their human rights. We should also put a hold on student visas for the children of senior Chinese officials. As for Chinese goods entering Canada, they need careful inspection with a "name and shame" approach to counterfeits and tainted goods.

We should also formally declare that Huawei equipment will not be used in our 5G network buildout because we do not trust China. We should stand with our Five Eyes intelligence partners – the United States, Britain, Australia and New Zealand – who fear Huawei will be a conduit for Chinese espionage or cybersabotage.

Our intelligence agencies report that Chinese agents are engaging in illicit activities, including trying to recruit Chinese students and influence politicians. These agents should be either arrested or, if they are working under diplomatic cover, sent home.

It's also time to send the current Chinese ambassador packing. Lu Shaye has accused Canada of "Western egotism and white supremacy." With the forced resignation of John McCallum as Canada's envoy to China, we also need a new ambassador in Beijing. The Chinese will expect our new envoy to have commensurate stature as our U.S. ambassador, David MacNaughton – a fair request – but we expect a Group of Seven-level ambassador in return.

Our next ambassador needs to be tough-minded and go into the job without illusions. Xi Jinping's China is authoritarian, and does not care about human rights. It believes that its system is superior and more efficient than liberal democracy.

A resurgent China is using the Meng affair to demonstrate its power and influence, and in doing so, it is redefining the norms of the rules-based order. Other authoritarians, looking to follow China's lead, are watching closely.

So we must push back. Efforts to bring international pressure to bear on Beijing netted public condemnatory statements on our hostages from some of our allies as well as an open letter from think tanks and former envoys to China. It annoyed and embarrassed Chinese leadership. We need to urge our allies to keep up that pressure.

Turning the other cheek and hoping for a change of heart won't work. Our hostages and canola farmers need help. Mr. Trudeau, it's time to fight back.

Links

Jeremy Kinsman

CTV News, April 9, 2019

Israel; Iran

<https://www.ctvnews.ca/video?clipId=1656585>

CTV News , April 16, 2019

New Alliance

<https://www.ctvnews.ca/video?clipId=1661902>

CTV News, April 23, 2019

Sri Lanka Bombings

<https://www.ctvnews.ca/video?clipId=1666734>

CTV News, April 30, 2019

Venezuela, Canadian Sentenced in China

<https://www.ctvnews.ca/video?clipId=1672281>

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